J. L. Austin on Statements by Walker, Michael Robert
University of Rhode Island
DigitalCommons@URI
Open Access Master's Theses
1977
J. L. Austin on Statements
Michael Robert Walker
University of Rhode Island
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Master's Theses by
an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walker, Michael Robert, "J. L. Austin on Statements" (1977). Open Access Master's Theses. Paper 1532.
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/1532
J. L. AUSTIN 
ON 
STATEMENTS 
BY 
MICHAEL ROBERT WALKER 
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
IN 
PHILOSOPHY 
·UNIVERSITY OFRHODE ISLAND 
1977 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Thesis Abs tract . . . . .. . ., . · . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . 
Introduction .•••••••••••••• . ••••••••• l 
CHAPTER I. • 
CHAPTER II • 
• · r' • • . • · • 
4 
28 
CHAPTER I I I • • • • • • • • • . • • • .. .. • • • • • • • 49 
CHAPTER IV. 
Further Remarks ••• 
CHAPTER V • • • 
Concluding Remarks • 
RESOURCES. • • • •. 
... •.. . •· . .. . 68 
• 80 
~ ~ 89 
• 103 
. . . . •- .. . . . •· . . . . .. . 107 
THESIS ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims at setting forth how J.L. Austin under-
stood the use of the term 'statement.' Austin put forth a doc-
trine analyzing the different aspects of an utterance. One of 
these aspects is the type of utterance it is, e.g., a statement 
rather than a command. Austin called this aspect the illocu-
tionary force of an utterance. The illocutionary force of an 
utterance is distinct from the meaning of the words used in making 
the utterance. On Austin's own admission, he neglected any dis-
cussion of the illocutionary force, or what I will call the claim-
making force of statements. It is for this reason that the use 
of the term 'statement' in his philosophy needs to be examined. 
In Chapter One, I want to present Austin's development of 
the illocutionary force thesis in How to Do Things with Words. In 
the first part of his book, Austin made a sharp distinction between 
statements and other types of utterances he called performatives, . 
e.g., warning, commanding, judging and promising. The distinction 
was based on the fact that performatives, unlike statements, wE:?r.e . 
not the kind of things which can be true or false. Performatives 
do not describe anything. Instead, they are the performing of 
acts in themselves. I will discuss in this chapter how Austin 
came to reject this distinction in favor of a distinction between 
the illocutionary force of an utterance and the other aspects of 
the utterance, i.e., its locutionary and prelocutionary aspects. 
Chapter two presents criticisms of the notion of the 
illocutionary force of an utterance. These criticisms argue 
that the illocutionary force of an utterance is not distinct from 
the meaning of the sentence used in making the utterance. They 
conclude that by unpacking and examining the meaning of the 
expressions used we will know what illocutionary act has been 
performed. 
Chapter three is a rebuttal to the arguments against 
Austin's notion of illocutionary force that were presented in the 
previous chapter. By presenting various arguments and examples, 
I want to show that the criticisms in Chapter two are mistaken. 
The conclusion reached claims that the meaning of the expressions 
used in the utterance will not exhaust the utterance's force. We 
can know one independently of the other. The point of these -two 
chapters is to offer a background for knowing and underst~nding 
the scope and importance of illocutionary force. 
In chapter four, I begin to discuss the claim-making force 
of a statement. The chapter involves a discussion of the key terms 
involved in uttering something with a claim-making force. I also 
discuss facts and knowledge of the facts. This is to show what 
should be emphasized and what should not be emphasized in analyzing 
the claim-making force of a statement if problems are to be avoided. 
The discussion shows how our knowledge at the time of the utterance 
is important for knowing that an utterance has a claim-making force. 
The last chapter begins by discussing some of the relevant . 
elements that are needed in order for an utterance to have a 
claim-making force. I offer various examples as well, to aid in 
showing that things like the speaker's status, circumstances, 
knowledge, reasons and evidence play a role in determining whether 
an utterance has a claim-making force. To be stating, I must be 
making a claim about some actual or putative states of affairs 
based on information to which I have access. For the uttering of 
a sentence to be a happy act of stating, I must know certain things 
about certain states of affairs which I have been in a good 
position to know. This leads me and my audience to understand that 
my utterance is the making of a truth-claim. 
INTRODUCTION 
As a philosopher of language, Austin put forth a doctrine 
analyzing the different aspects of an utterance. One of these 
aspects deals with how the utterance is to be taken, e.g., as a 
statement as opposed to a command. Austin called this aspect 
the illocutionary force of an utterance. He is interested in 
what it is about an utterance that makes it a particular type of 
discourse, i.e., promising, commanding, stating, etc. My purpose 
is to discuss the illocutionary force, or what I choose to call 
claim-making force, of a statement. On his own admission, Austin 
neglected any discussion of the illocutionary force of statements . . 
I shall explore how Austin wnuld have explicated the illocutionary 
force of a statement if he had expanded his own discussion of this 
particular type of force. How is it that I may be said to be 
stating something? For one thing, I must be making a claim about 
some actual or putative state of affairs in the world based on my 
knowledge of the facts. Also, if I am to be taken as stating some-
thing, then my claim must be recognized as based on adequate infor-
mation to which I have access. If this instance of stating some-
thing is to be, to use Austin's words, happy or appropriate, then 
everything must be in order for performing this particular act o( 
stating, i.e., I must know certain things .. about certain states of 
affairs which I have been in a good position to ascertain. It is 
2 
these things that I want to bring out and discuss about a particular 
utterance so that I amy determine whether it is the successful use 
of the utterance. 
I will not be interested in defining o~ explaining exactly 
what a statement is. Instead, I will concern myself with those 
things that need to be appropriate in order for a person to infer 
that a certain utterance is being used with a claim-making force. 
Although much of Austin's How to Do Things with ·Words is devoted 
to elucidating what he called illocutionary force, he omitted any 
discussion of the force thesis in connection with statements. I 
shall be discussing how Austin would have construed the illocu-
tionary force of a statement. In How to Do Things with Words, 
Austin showed how statements and other types of speech acts, i.e., 
warning or coll1llanding have a lot in common. This common aspect 
between statements and self-motives has to do with the illocu-
tionary elements of an utterance. Austin was interested in showing 
that certain things need to be in order for a warning or a state-
ment to be considered the appropriate - thing to have said. Austin 
believed that those reasons and evidence that make a warning the 
correct thing to issue (words are uttered; warnings are issued, or 
given) also make a statement the correct thing to say. In general, 
certain things need to be in order before I -can succeed in making 
a statement or issuing a warning. It is the total speech situation 
that must be considered so that we may know what type of act is 
being performed. The speech situation will indicate whether an 
utterance is being used to issue, or give a warning or whether it 
is being used to make a statement. What I want to do is deal 
specifically with those things in a situation from which we may 
infer that the utterance is being used with a claim-making force. 
If it can be correctly said to be an instance of stating, then we 
can go on to see whether the statement made correspoDds to the 
facts truly or falsely. I am only interested in assessing a 
statement as to its force and not as to its truth or falsity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Since I am going to examine what Austin understood the use 
of the word 'statement' to be and what that use entails, it will 
be important to include Austin's attempt to distinguish performa-
tive and constative utterances, the reasons for the failure of 
that attempt, and his introduction of a theory of speech acts to 
replace that distinction. This is necessary since the performa-
tive -constative distinction ultimately fails for Austin due to 
his further analysis of the use of 'statement'. This analysis 
leads him to the formulalton of the illocutionary vs. locutionary 
speech-act theory. The inclusion of this topic will aid in . 
gaining a clear notion of what Austin understood statements, or 
the use of the word 'statement' . to be, especially with regard to 
the later theory. 
Early in How to Do Things with Words, Austin introduces 
4 
his theory of performative which he distinguishes from what he 
calls 'constatives'. Constatives are simply those types of 
utterances "whose main characteristic is that they are true or 
false descriptions or reports, etc. 111 Constatives represent those 
utterances which are used to describe or report something which, 
accordingly, can be either true or false. Thus, for example, the 
truth or falsity of the constative utterance "It is raining outside 
now" depends on whether it is raining outside at the moment the 
Christopher Olsen, "Austin's Worries About 'I State That 
.•. ", Mind, Vol. 76 (January, 1967); p. 111. 
utterance is made. 
A performative utterance represents something Austin wants 
to distinguish from constatives. He distinguishes this type of-
utterance from constatives in order to question "an age-old 
assumption in philosophy -- the assumption that to say something, 
at least in all cases worth considering, i.e. all cases considered, 
is always and simply to state something112 which could either be 
true or false. He wants to discuss forms of words which are not 
used to make statements of fact. They characterize something 
totally different, even though in some cases they may be mistaken 
for constatives. 
Austin 2 calls this different type of utterance 11a performa-
• 
tive sentence or a performative utterance, or, for short, 
Ii 
'a performative' "which is "derived, of course, from 'perform', 
the usual verb with the noun 'action 1113 Its function "indicates 
that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action 114 
"or is the part of, the doing of an action 115. A performative 
utterance does not describe or report an action, rather it is the 
. 
act or action itself. It is the performing of the action as con-
trasted with constatives which may report or describe an action. 
Because of this feature, it is not the kind of utterance which can 
be true or false as is the case with statements of fa~t, i.e., 
constatives. 
2J.L. Austin~ How to Do ThiMgs=with Wotds. New York: Oxford 
University Press,-1965. · p. 12. 
3Ibid., p. 6. 4--
Ibid., p. 6. 5--
Ibid., p. 5. 
5 
There can be examples of saying something "worth consider-
ing116 which are not simply instances of stating something. 
Utterances and sayings such as: 'I promise so-and-so', 'I bet 
so-and-so, 1 1 I bequeath such-and-such 1 , or I I do I as uttered 
in a marriage ceremony are examples of performatives. In none 
of these utterances is the speaker describing something he has 
done. The speaker is in fact doing something in uttering these 
words; his utterances are not about those acts represented by 
the above examples; they are those acts. To say 'I promise' is 
not to report an instance of promising, 'I promise' is the act of 
promising: 11The uttering of the word is, indeed, usually a, or 
even the, leading incident in the performance of the act. 117 11I 
do11 does not report an instance of marrying someone; it is an 
act performed in the course of marrying someone. 
6 
Performat ives are neither true nor false, because they do 
not describe or report anyting in the constative sense. Austin 
says 11 I assert this as obvious and do not argue it. 118 We do not 
say of 'I promise so-and-so' that it was uttered truly or false]y. 
One who utters this simply obliges himself to fulfill certain 
intentions. If we accept someone as serirusly making a promise, 
and that individual in turn does not fulfill those intentions to 
which he obliged himself, he still, nonetheless, made a promise. 
. Ibid., p. 13 . 7--
Ibid. , 8-- p. 8. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
The promise was just made in bad faith or not followed through, 
it is not false that he promised. A promise is not false because 
we can and often do hold someone accountable for a promise or bet 
that is unfilled. The veracity of someone making a statement no 
longer needs to be maintained or disputed, as when the statement 
has been shown to misrepresent what is actually the case. 
This brings me to my next point about performatives: what 
is it that has to occur for a performative either to take place 
or for it to fall through, not to happen? 
Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the 
circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in 
some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly 
necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons, 
should also perform certain other actions, whether 'physi-
cal' or 'mental' actions or even acts of uttering further 
words.9 · 
7 
To make a promise, I not only have to be serious, and be taken as 
serious, but I must also perform those actions which will serve to 
obligate myself. But promising is not a description of those actions, 
for even if they do not happen, I still promised, it was just given 
"in bad faith, or not implemented.1110 That is why, analogously, we 
can convict someone of bigamy; the circumstances for marrying some-
one were not appropriate, i.e., one of the participants was not 
single . . The uttering . of . a performative is one of the necessary 
9 lbid., p .. 8. 
10 
Ibid., p. 11. 
circumstances for performing certain acts. 
This brings us to the conditions under which Austin felt 
that a performative could be taken as being successful or going 
wrong. He characterizes this as the 'happy' or 'unhappy' 
functioning of the performative. The conditions for a 1 happy1 
performative are as follows: 
(A. l) 
(A.2) 
( B. l ) 
(B.2) 
(r. l) 
(r. 2) 
There must exist an accepted conventional procedure 
having a certain conventional effect, that pro-
cedure to include the uttering of certain words by 
certain persons in certain circumstances, and 
further, 
the particular persons and circumstances in a given 
case must be appropriate for the invocation of the 
particular procedure invoked. 
The procedure must be executed by all participants 
both correctly and 
completely 
Where~ as often, the procedure is designed for use 
by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or 
for the inauguration of certain consequential con-
duct on the part of any participant, then a person 
participating in and so invoking the procedure must 
in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the 
participants must intend so to conduct themselves, 
and further, 
11 
must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. 
8 
To violate any of these rules will make a performative utterance = 
unhappy. These violations Aus~in terms ''infelicities." These rules 
also show that the mere uttering of the performative is not 
sufficient for it to be happy. In considering relevant conditions, 
Austin wants to exclude from considerations those circumstances 
11 
Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
9 
that cause utterances to go wrong because they are "used not 
seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its ·normal use," such as 
acting, poems, or jokes, instead of being "understood in ordinary 
circumstances. 1112 
The infelicities that Austin described represent violations 
of the above rules. Thus, "we ~hall call in general those infeli-
cities A.1 - B.2 which are such that the act for the performing of 
which, and in performing of which, the verbal formula in question 
is designed, is not achieved, by the name MISFIRES: and on the 
other hand we may christen those infelicities (the r .1 and r .2 
types) where the act is achieved ABUSES.1113 Austin's two concepts 
of misfires and abuses can be used "to crack the crib of Reality. 
or as it may be, of Confusion" for to be "forearmed should be fore-
warned.1114 
During his discussions of infelicities Austin distinguishes 
between explicit performatives and implicit performatives. Explicit 
performatives 
But 
Ibid., 
1r-
Ibid., 
14--
Ibid., 
lS-
Ibid., 
it 
(all) begin with or include some highly significant 
and unambiguous expression such as 'I bet,' 'I promise,' 
'I bequeath' -- an expression very commonly used in 
naming the act which, in making such an utterance, I 
am performing -- for example betting, promising, 
bequeathing.TS 
should also . be clear that a 
p. 22. · 
p. 16. 
p. 25. 
p. 32. 
performative may be uttered implicitly, i.e., "the utterance 
'I order you to go•~16 "Austin employed this distinction 
solely to account for an expression's being a performative 
despite the fact that it does not satisfy the grammatical 
criterion for performatives. 1117 A performative does not 
have to look like one to be one. 
Early in his discussion of infelicities, Austin briefly 
mentioned doubts he had about the performative-constative 
distinction, which he later expanded to show that the original 
distinction was not as clear as he originally thought. He 
began by asking "does the notion of infelicity apply to utter-
ances which are statements? 1118 
Evidence that the original distinction begins to 
blur together for Austin can be seen when he claims 
that there is no reason to doubt.that stating some-
thing is performing an act ju~t as much as is giving 
an order or giving a warning; and we see, on the other 
hand, that, when we give an order or a warning or a 
piece of advice, there is a question about how this is 
related to fact which is not perhaps so very different 
from the kind of question that arise 1 when we discuss how a statement is related to fact." 9 
Their soecific domains of interest are found to be related. For 
this reasons, I will try to answer, first, what it is about per-
formatives that makes them like statements, and second, what it 
16 Ib.d 3 l • , p • • 
17 John Beversluis, "I know: An Illocutionary Analysis", 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 9 (Winter, 1971) p. 
18 349. 
10 
19 Ibid. , p. 20. J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances," Philosophical Papers. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970. p. 251. 
is about statements that makes them like performatives. This 
should make it clear what it is about both types of utterances 
that cause the distinction to fail. 
Austin held that there was one aspect of performatives 
which was similar to something found in statements. This was 
how performatives are "related in some way to fact. 1120 Per-
formatives can be judged by considering how they agree or fit 
with the facts. These considerations seem to imply 11that for a 
certain performative utterance to be happy, certain statements 
have to be true." 21 This suggests that the performatives going 
right or wrong is as much involved with a correspondence to the 
facts as statements are in being true or false. Austin lists 
four conditions that need to be true for a performative to be 
happy: 
(1) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is happy, 
then the ~statement that I am apologizing is true. 
(2) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be 
happy, then the · statement that certain conditions 
obtain -- those notably in Rules A.l and A.2 -- must 
be true. 
(3) If the performative utterance ' I apologize is to 
be happy, then the statement that certain other con-
ditions obtain -- those notably in our rule . l 
must be true. 
(4) If performative utterances of at least some kinds are 
happy, for example contractual ones, then statements 
of the form that I ought or ought not22ubsequently to do some particular thing are true. -
20Ibid., p.251. 2,--
Austin, How to Do Things with Words. p. 45. 
22 
Ibid., p. 53. 
11 
Performatives imply certain things which can either be 
true or false, and this is a characteristic of statements. 
The implications of performatives are comparable to the im-
plications of statements. · The statement implications Austin 
was interested in were those of entailment, implication and 
presumption. I shall take each one of these separately and 
show its similarity with performative implications. 
Entailment had to do with the idea, for example, that 
111 All men blush' entails 'some men blush'" and that we 
"cannot say 'All men blush but not any men blush"'23 "Here 
the truth of a proposition entails the truth of a further pro-
position or the truth of one is inconsistent with the truth of 
another. 1124 To c.ompare this with performatives Austin said: 
'I promise' entails 'I ought'" and that 
promise but I ought not' is parallel to it is 
not: to say 'I promise' but not to perform 
is parallel to saying both 'it is' and 'it is 
I I 
and it is 
that 2act not' ~ 
Just as the purpose of assertion is defeated by an internal 
contradiction •.. , the purpose of a contract is defeated if we 
say 'I promise and I ought not.' 1126 The comparison to be made 
here is between entailment, as an implication found in statement 
making, and the fourth type of condition for happy performatives 
described above. 
Ibid., 
24--
p. 47. 
Ibid., p. 49. 
25Ibid., p. 51. 
26"j~ D 1 • , p. 51. 
12 
13 
Implication says, according to Austin, that '"the cat is 
on the mat' implies that I believe it is" and that we "cannot say 
'the cat is on the mat but I do not believe it is. 111 27 An 
assertion "implies a belief. 1128 If one makes an assertion 
statinq or claiming something but holds that he does not believe 
it, then "Clearly it is a case of insincerity. 1129 Thus, "the 
unhappiness here is, though affecting a statement, exactly the 
same as the unhappiness infecting 'I promise' ... when I do not 
intend, do not believe, & c. because to say 'I promise, with-
out intending, is parallel to saying 'it is the case' without 
believing. 1130 This is similar to the third condition for happy 
performatives described above. 
Finally, presupposition, with regard to statements would 
say something like '"All Jack's children' presupposes that Jack 
has some children and we "cannot say 'All Jack's children are 
bald but Jack has no chi1dren 11 •31 What can be said of a statement 
that is similar to the example quoted? "It is usual now to say 
that it is not false because it is devoid of reference: refer-
ence is necessary for either truth or falsehood. 1132 To Austin 
27Ibid., p. 48. 
28--
Ibid., 
29--
p. 49. 
Ibid., 
30--
p. 50. 
Ibid., p. 50. 
31 
Ibid., p. 48. 32--
Ibid., p. 50. 
"the utterance is void." 33 Comparing this with performatives 
we find something similar to the non-fulfillment conditions 
(A. 1 and A.2). "Here we might have used the 'presuppose' 
formula: we might say that the formula 'I do' presupposes lots 
of things: if they are not satisfied the formula i~ unhappy, 
void: it does not succeed in being a contract when the reference 
fails ..• any more than the other succeeds in being a statement~34 
This is all comparable or similar to the second condition for 
happy performatives described above. 
14 
So far, I have presented Austin's observation that per-
formatives have a lot in common with statements. Now I want to 
expound his view that statements can be infected by infelici-
ties, that were up to now only considered applicable to performa-
tives. This has to do with showing "that considerations of the 
happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements." 35 For if . 
someone says 'It is raining outside but I don't believe it; then 
his act of stating is vitiated and his statement goes wronq just 
as the performative 'I promise I will go but I have no intention 
of being there' goes wrong, one is simply uttering a sentence 
that misfires. Also, knowinqly makinq a statement about something 
which does not exist makes as much sense, and goes wrong in the 
same way, as contractinq to sell something you do not own. Thus, 
33Ibid., 
34--
p. 51. 
35Ibid., p. 51. 
_Ibid., p. 55. 
it would seem that we can use the same criteria to assess both 
constatives and performatives, i.e., both in terms of a relation 
to the facts and being happy or unhappy. Hence, we could say 
something along the following lines: 
To take statements first, connected with the utterance 
(constative) 'John is runnino' is the statement 'I am 
stating that John is running~ and this may depend for 
its truth on the happiness of 'John is running', just as 
the truth of 'I am3gpologizing' depends on the happiness of 'I apologize'. 
Likewise, in a performative: "connected with the performative 'I 
warn you that the bull is about to charge' is the fact, if it is 
one, that the bu 11 is about to charge. 11 If it is not then the 
warning "is open to criticism" not in the ways viewed as 'unhappi-
ness', but, as with a statement, "to say the warning was false, 1137 
i.e., unrelated to fact. 
The next point of comparison had to do with whether there 
15 
"is some grammatical criterion for distinguishing the performative 
utterance 1138 from the constative. The gra111matical criterion that 
Austin settles on is the first person singular present indicative 
active. The first person sinqular present indicative active reveals 
that the "'I' who is doing the action does thus come essentially 
into the picture" and that the "implicit feature of the speech-
situation is made explicit. 1139 It also should be clear that all 
performatives are not of this form, i.e., 'Go', 'Guilty!' etc. 
36Ibid., 
37--
p. 55. 
Ibid., p. 55. 
38Ibid., p. 55. 
39Ibid., p. 61. 
16 
Performatives, therefore, "should be reducible, or expandable, 
or analysable into a form with a verb in the first person singular 
present indicative active. 1140 Thus 'Go' becomes 'I order you to 
go' and 'Guilty!' becomes 'I hereby find you guilty'. This will 
make 11explicit both that the utterance is performative, and which 
act it is that is being performed.1141 
But it is not always possible to reduce a performative to 
an explicit form. For this reason he introduces the notion of a 
'primary utterance' which is opposed to an 'explicit performative'. 
An example of the former is 111 ! shall be there"' while for the 
latter it is 11'I promise that I shall be there' 11•42 The point 
here is that the answer to the question 'Is that a promise?' may 
either be "'Yes, I promise it 111 or "'No, but I do intend to be' 11• 43 
There seems, then, to be a certain ambiguity over how the primary 
performative can be taken while explicit formulas make it clear 
"the different forces that this utterance might have.1144 Thus, 
there seems to be a type of utterance, 'I shall be there,' which 
is in between being reducible to a performative or being a des-
cription of something that is going to be done; i.e., it can be 
used both descriptively and perfonnatively. But the 'primary 
utterance' could become an implicit performative, if, for some 
reason, the situation in which it is uttered reveals that 'I shall 
be there' was meant as a promise. 
40Ibid., p. 62. 
41-
I bid. , p • 62 • 
42-
Ib id. , p. 69. 
43-
Ibid., p. 69. 
44--
Ibid., p. 73. 
17 
Austin also introduced what he called, expositive performatives, 
performatives which seemed to be descriptive, yet still performed an 
action. Some of tis examples of these were, 111 I argue (or urge) that 
there is no backside to the moon.11145 This seems to be both performa-
tive and descriptive. 
Here the main body of the utterance has generally 
or often the straightforward form of a 'statement•, but 
there is an explicit performative verb at its head which 
shows how the 'statement' is to be fitted into the context 
of conversation, interlocution, dialogue, or in general of 
exposition.46 
Here we have a combination of performative verbs and statements. 
Since a performative is the performance of an action by uttering 
something, it is obvious that we could not be performining an act 
of arguing without making some kind of statement. 
From here one can move to performatives, such as, 'I approve', 
'I apologize' and 'I criticize', 'I forecast', 'I endorse' and 'I 
question•. 47 The point of these is that the "explicit performative 
verb itself operates, or operates sometimes or in part, as a des-
cription, true or false, of feelings, states of mind, etc., 11 which 
points to 11the wider phenomenon ••• where the whole utterance seems 
essentially meant to be true or false despite its performative 
characteristics. 1148 They describe as well as perform an action. 
Ibid., p. 85. 
4~ 
Ibid., p. 85. 
4~ 
Ibid •• in passim pp~ 79-98. 
49- · 
· Ibid., p. 89. 
18 
It is only a short step now to showing the similarity be-
tween performatives and statements or constatives. Thus,"'! warn 
you that ••• ' or 'I promise to .•. ' does not look so very different 
from 'I state that .•• "' and it "makes clear surely that the act 
we are performing is an act of stating, and so functions just like 
'I warn' or 'I order 11149 When we come to instances of 'I state' 
or 'I maintain' then 
surely the whole thing is true or false even 
though the uttering of it is the performining of the 
action of stating or maintaining. So, under the gralll'lla-
tical criterion for distinguishing between performatives 
and statements it becomes possible to put stating into 
the explicit performative form which is also something 
true or false. Therefore, the distinction fails to dis-
tinguish between them, and in fact statements can satis-
fy the requirements of being performatives, yet which 
surely are the making of statements, ans surely are 
essentially true or false.SO 
Statements, thus become a class of performatives, with the added 
feature of also being true or false. 
The supposed distinction between performatives and consta~ 
tives utterances has failed on three counts. First, it was found 
that considerations of the happiness or unhappiness of a performa-
tive also apply to constatives; second, considerations of a 
constative's truth or falsity apso apply to performatives. Thirdly, 
the grammatical criterion of putting all pe~formatives in their ex-
plicit form allows utterances beginning 'I state that ••. 1 which 
seem to satisfy the requirements of being performative, yet which 
J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances", p. 247. 
50 
J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 91. 
are still statements. 
What we need to do for the case of stating, and by 
the same token describing and reporting, is to take them 
a bit off their pedestal, to realize that they are speech-
acts, no less than all these other speech-acts that we 
have been mentioning and talking about as performative. 51 
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111 True1 and 'false' are just general labels for a whole dimension 
of different appraisals which have something or other to do with 
the relation between what we say and the facts. 52 All we have to 
do is "loosen up our ideas of truth and falsity and we shall see 
that statements •.• are not so different after all from pieces of 
advice, warnings, verdicts, and so on."53 This entire discussion, 
up to this point, seems to indicate that what needs to be examined 
is "the total situation in which the utterance is issued -- the to-
tal speech-act -- if we are to see what is involved in making an 
utterance.« 54 
It would seem, then, that with the collapse of the performa-
tive-constative distinction, Austin needs to look elsewhere for a 
classificatory scheme of utterances. This is precisely what he 
does in the remainder of How to Do Things with Words. "We want to 
reconsider more generally the senses in which to say something may 
be to do something, or in saying something we do something (and 
Austin, "Performative Utterances". p. 250. 
52 
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also perhaps to consider the~ different case in which by saying 
something we do something).1155 
Austin began this by providingt a more lucid definition of 
a key concept. This has to do with the aasic notion of making an 
utterance. He wanted to reveal exactly what is involved when we 
say anything "in the full sense of 'say ' ".56 Austin offered the 
following explanation that to say something is: 
{A.a) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises 
{a phonetic act), and the utterance is a phone; 
(A.b) always to perform the act of uttering certin vocables 
or words, i.e., noises of certain types belonging to and 
as belonging to certain vocabulary, in a certain construc-
tion, i.e., conforming to and as conforming to a certain 
gra1J111ar, with a certain intonation, etc. This act we may 
call a 'phatic' act, and the utterance which is vocalized 
'pheme' (as distinct from the phememe of <l} nguistic theory); 
and 
20 
{A.c) generally to perform the act of using that pheme or its 
constituents with a certain more or less definite 'reference' 
{which together are equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we 
may call a 'rhetic' act, ag~ the utterance which it is the 
act of uttering a 'rheme' . 
This description represents what it is for someone to say something. 
Austin says that the "act of 'saying something' in this full normal 
sense I call, i.e., dub, the performance of a locutionary act, and 
the study of utterances thus far and in these respects the study of 
locutions, or of the full units of speech. 1158 Anytime that we say 
something, ordering someone, warning someone, etc., we are, in 
addition, performing a locutionary act. When we perform a phonetic 
act which is of a type that belongs to some vocabulary and some 
:>Sibid. p. 91. ss-- , 
Ibid., p. 92. 5,--
Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
58-Ibid., p. 94. 
., 
grammar which in turn is used more or less with some 'sense' and 
reference, then we are performing a locutionary act. In particu-
lar, 
'Mean·ing' for Austin principally "attaches to" 
the rhetic aet (or to the use of a pheme in a certain 
way), and so is meaning in a use; whereas, meaning in 
isolation would have to "attach to" the pheme (the 
pheme itself, not the phatic act and not to use of the 
pheme). 59 
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Also, to perform a rhetic act is to perform a phatic act and to 
perform a phatic act is to perform a phonetic act. But the con-
verse does not hold. Parrots may mimic words phonetically but 
they are not performing a phatic act, and we may repeat sentences 
in a phatic act wffthout comprehending its meaning so that we would 
not be performing any rhetic act. This shows what is involved and 
what has to be involved in perfroming a locutionary act. 
From here Austin moved on to his next classification, in 
fact the one of most importance, both in his book and this thesis. 
After the locutionary act is performed, how then is it to be taken? 
How is it clear what we meant to do in issuing the utterance? Are 
we warning, ordering, or stating? .. It may be perfectly clear what 
I mean by 'It is going to charge' ••• , but not tlear whether it is 
meant as a statement or warning. 1160 To answer these questions 
Austin introduced the notion of the 'illocutionary' act performed 
in making the locutionary act. To determine what illocutionary 
Robert W. Burch, "Cohen, Austin and Meaning", Ratio. 
Vol. 15 (June 1973), p. 120. 
60 
Austin, How to Do Things with Words. p. 98. 
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act is perfromed we must determine in what way we are using the 
locution, i.e., whether we are stating, ordering, warning, begging, 
appointing, acquitting, promising, apologizing, or answering. 
An illocutionary act has to do with how we want an utterance 
that we make to be taken. Does an utterance have the force of a 
warning or a statement? The performance of an act in this sense is 
the "performance of an act in saying something as opposed to per-
formance of an act of saying something" and Austin will "refer to 
the doctrine of the different types of function of language here 
in question as the doctrine of 'illocutionary forces'. 1161 The 
force of an utterance is to be distinguished from its meaning which 
I will discuss further after I discuss the third kind of act that 
can be obtained from the making of an utterance. 
The third type of act distinguished by Austin is the 'per-
locutionary' act. A perlocutionary act is the production of 
"certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or 
actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons ••• 
with the design, intention or purpose of producing them.1162 
Perlocutions have to do with the consequences of an utterance. In 
distinguishing the illocutionary from the perlocutionary "we must 
distinguish 'in saying it I was warning him' from 'by saying it I 
convinced him, or surprised him, or got him to stop 1 • 1163 
What is important now is the illocutionary act and its rela-
tion to the other two acts. First of all, "to perform an 
61 
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illocutionary act is necessarily to perform a locutionary act: 
that for example, to congratulate is necessarily, at least in 
part, to make certain more or less indescribable movements 
with the vocal organs. 1164 It is this relation that is important 
for our purposes, especially in view of the discussion of the 
criticisms to be leveled against Austin '. in the next chapter, so 
I will only briefly discuss periocutions. An illocution would 
have the form "'In saying XI was doing Y' or 'I did Y'" while 
for a perlocution it would be "'By saying X I did Y' or "I was 
doing Y' 11 • 65 The illocutionary form can make explicit what is 
being done, for example "in saying A ••• I was warning." The 
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"names of illocutionary acts seem to be pretty close to explicit 
performatives, for we can say 'I warn you that' and 'I order you 
to' as explicit performatives; but warning and ordering are 
illocutioriary acts. 1166 To describe illocutions we "can use the 
performative 'I warn you that' but not 'I convince you that', and 
can use the performative 'I threaten you with' but not 'I intimi-
date you by'; convincing and intimidatinq are perlocutionary 
acts. 1167 What is important is how the verbs relate to the action. 
In an illocutionary act the verb constitutes the action, while in 
a perlocutionary act the verb suggests the outcome of an action, 
i.e., 'I was convinced' or 'I was intimidated'. 
64 
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Austin suggested that whenever I 'say' anything "I shall be 
performing both locutionary and illocutionary acts, these two 
kinds of acts seem to be the very things which we tried to use. as 
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a means of distinguishing, under the names of 'doing' and 'saying' 
performatives from constatives. 1168 Austin wanted to discuss this 
from the perspective of constatives, of which he considers "state-
ments' as the typical or paradigm case. 1169 Considering all that 
has been said up to this point, then the making of a statement can 
be said to be both the 'doing' and the 'saying' of something! 
"Surely to state is every bit as much to perform an illocutionary 
act as, say, to warn or to pronounce," for example 11! state that he 
did not do it is exactly on a level with I argue that he did not 
do it. 1170 
We can distinguish the illocutionary force of a statement in 
exactly the same way we would a warning. When we do, it reveals 
how an utterance is to be taken, specifically as a statement rather 
than a warning. His conclusion here is that there is no conflict 
between "our issuing the utterance being the doing of something" 
and its "being true or false. 1171 We have already examined~the 
ways in which a statement ean be appraised in the same way that 
performat ives can, as .happy or unhappy, and subject to the same in-
felicities. This also suggests the ways in which stating can be 
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like other illocutionary acts such as warning or ordering. 
In view of all this, what then can be said about the per-
fonnative-constative distinction with which we started? Austin 
said that what we have is this: 
(a) With the constative utterance, we abstract from the 
illocutionary aspects of the speech act and we con-
centrate on the 1ocut1onary: moreover, we use an 
over-stmplified notion of correspondence with the 
fact -- over-simplified because essentially it brings 
in the illocutionary aspect. 
(b) With the performative utterance, we attend as much 
possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, 
and abstract 2from the dimension of correspondence with facts .7 
These important points reveal that in general the locu-
tionary act as much as the illocutionary act is an abstraction 
only: every genuine speech act is both. 1173 This emphasizes the 
need to be able to distinguish between illocutions and locutions, 
and it also emphasizes that in performing an illocutionary act 
we perfonn a locutionary acts which is to be taken in a certain 
way. For all utterances Austi~ has discovered the following: 
(1) Happiness/unhappiness dimension 
(2) An illocutionary force 
(3) Truth/falsehood dimension 
(4) A locutionary meaning (sense and reference) 74 
All utterances confonn to this, although they may attend to some 
aspects more than do others, for example, statements with (3) and 
(4). 
Ibid., pp. 144-145. 
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In the last lecture in How to Do Things with Words, Austin 
mentions several mJrals that he wants to suggest with respect to 
the discussion up to that point. These are: 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
( D) 
(E) 
The total speech act in the total speech situation is 
the only phenomenon which ••• we are engaged in elucidating. 
Stating, describing, etc., are just two names among a 
very great many others for illocutionary acts; they 
have no unique position. 
In particular, they have no unique position over the 
matter of being related to facts in a unique way called 
being true or false, ·because truth and falsity are •.• 
not names for relations, qualities, or what not, but 
for a dimension of assessment •.. 
••• the familiar contrast of 'normative' nr 'evaluative' 
as opposed to the factual is in need •• ;of elimination. 
••• that the theory of 'meaning' equivalent to 'sense 
and reference' will require .••. reformulating in terms 
of the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts .. _75 
Thus, Austin has subsumed the original distinction between consta-
tfves and performatives under the distinction between locutionary 
and illocutionary acts. This he did by showing their similarities 
and then how they represent abstractions of types of actions he 
had in mind when he developed his later notion of an illocutionary 
act. 
The aim in the last two chapters will be to specifically 
consider the nature of statements, as the paradigm cases of consta-
tives, with respect to their illocutionary force. This , is, more 
or less, to fill in what Austin intentionally neglected, for he 
admits that "I have omitted any direct consideration of the illo-
cutionary force of statements. 117~ 
~~Ibid., pp. 147-148. 
Ibid., p. 148. 
But before doing this I want to present and examine in the next 
two chapters vari ous criticisms directed against Austin's notion 
of illocutionary force. 
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CHAPTER 2
In this chapter I will present three different philosopher's 
criticisms of the Austinian views expressed in the first chapter. 
These will be the criticisms of P.F. Strawson, John R. Searle and 
L. Jonathan Cohen. The Searle and Cohen criticisms are leveled 
specifically against the locutionary and illocution~ry acts 
performed in an utterance, while the Strawson criticism will be 
drawn from another, but related, aspect of Austin's philosphy. 
This will be from the Austin-Strawson debate on truth and will be 
included for a number of reasons. These reasons are: (1) that 
it will help the reader understand what Austin took a statement 
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to be, something he did not fully do in How to Do Thinqs with 
Words, (2) that it will serve as an introduction and aid in dis-
covering and understanding the concepts being disputed, especially 
•with regard to .the Searle and Cohen criticisms and (3) that it will 
reveal what Austin incorporated and changed about his notion of a 
statement and utterances as later seen in How to Do Thinqs with 
Words as a result of Strawson's criticisms. Althouqh the Austin-
Strawson debate deals with how phrases such as 'It is true that -- 1 
and 1 -- is true' are used, I will deal specifically with that part 
of the debate concerned with statements. 
,l\.ustin and Strawson held contrary opinions on how I is 
true' is used or functions when attached to a sentence. Austin 
believed that the addition of 1 -- is true' involves the making 
of a statement about a statement. Austin's thesis was that a 
phrase like this is used to assert a conventional relationship 
between a statement made in performing an utterance and some 
non-linguistic situation in the world. To Austin, ,:the truth 
of statements remains stil ·l a matter, as it was with the most 
rudimentary languages, of the words being the ones convention-
ally appointed for situations of the type of which that referred 
belongs. 111 The addition of 'is true' is just our way of assert-
ing the relation between the words used in making a statement 
and the situation it is about. A phrase like 'is true' is to be 
taken as asserting something about the statement to which it is 
attached, i.e., that it correctly describes some non-linguistic 
state of affairs. 
Strawson takes the opposite position in how 'is true' is 
used. To Strawson the addition of 'is true' is superfluous and 
redundant to the rest of the sentence to which it is attached. 
To say that ~rt is true that it is raining outside' is to say no 
more than 'It is raining outside.' These two utterances make the 
same claim, thatit is raining outside. This means the addition 
of the 'It is true that' does not add or assert anything more 
than was already there. He also maintains that 'true' has 
nothing to do with words and the world. All we are saying is that 
the statement was or could be stated. What needs to be answered 
1 
J.L. Austin, "Truth", Truth, ed. George Pitcher (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964) p. 25. 
29 
is both how he arrived at this conclusion and what it means for 
Austin's interpretation of statements. 
On Strawson's interpretation, 'true' will still be about 
a statement, but it will have nothing to do with adding some-
thing about the correctness of the words used in the statement. 
'That's true' and '--- is true' have a different function. To 
Strawson, 'is true' is predicated of the type of thing that can 
or will be uttered. It is about "a potential, if not an actual 
statement; a potential, if not an actual conjecture .... 112 
'That's true' does not have to specify anything in particular 
about the utterance used in making the statement. The specific 
u'tterance is "not to be identified with a statement(= what is 
stated) which is the subject of predication of 'is true' .... 113 
It is not to be identified with the words used in making the 
statements. There is no . reason for an analysis of'true' to 
specify anything about the content of the utterance. A statement 
is expressed by, but not identified with, a sentence. This demon-
strates in what sense 'is true' can be .about a statement without 
adding anything to the content and is elucidated by offerinq a 
'Ramsey-like' analysis of sentences containing 'is true'. For 
example, "A's statement that Xis eligible, is true" can be 
paraphrased "As A stated, Xis eligible. 114 We have a reference 
2 
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P.F. Strawson, "A Problem about Truth ... " Truth, ed. George 
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to a statement without anything being substantially added to it. 
It is just something that can or could be stated. Another 
example is, 11A1.s statement (what A stated) is true. 115 Here there 
is nothing known about the content of the made statement. We can 
obtain paraphrases such as 'It is as A says it is' or 'Thinqs 
are as A states." All they do is allude to the fact that something 
was stated while adding nothinq to the content of the statement 
uttered. 
Yet, although Strawson wants to separate a statement from 
the sentence uttererl in makinq it, one still has to admit a 
dependence on words and sentences. To express a statement, one 
is necessarily coITJT1itted to using words. How can one express a 
statement without doino so? One cannot. Although Strawson wants 
to exclude any mention of the words used in making a statement 
from any consideration of 1 truth 1 it still has to be maintained 
that statements can only be made with words, i.e., ... words do have 
to be used. Strawson believes they just are not important to 
knowing truth. To say 'is true' for Strawson is to affirm the 
obtaining of some particular state of affairs which we already 
stated to obtain. This has nothing to do with the making of a 
statement, it is instead concerned only with the 11fact, that 
matters are as stated. 116 Thus,with regard to truth, the act of 
making a statement is quite distinct from the statement made, 
and truth applies to the latter but not the former. 
5 Ibid., p. 76. 6--
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Even though Strawson's criticisms demonstrated that state-
ments cannot be identified with the words used to make state-
ments, the importance of words cannot be stressed enough. We use 
words to make statements; it is the only way we can know them. 
Yet, words are also used to make orders, laws, promises, opinions. 
But words used to do these things do not have the same import as 
words used to make statements; they are taken differently. Such 
things as commands are not taken as true or false. They do not 
make any claims about the world. We use words to perform different 
types of discourse and it is only as words are used that we can 
know a promise as one type and a statement as another type. To 
recognize a statement is to know that some claim is being made 
about some state of affairs. By contrast, when someone uses words 
to make a promise or issue a command, he is not making a claim 
about the world, and therefore, what he says is not capable of 
being true or false. It is because we can know when words are 
uttered that a certain type of discourse is the making of a state-
ment that words should be emphasized in the explication of 
statements. 
Strawson1 s claims about truth are not concerned with words 
as used. He feels that the "problem of Truth" is not the 
"problem of elucidating the fact-stating type of discourse. 117 
Strawson's problem is based on the notion that usina "different 
7Tb. ' 
~-, p. 42. 
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sentences ... sentences with different meanings, we all make the 
same statement. 118 His example is that when "you say of Jones 
'He is ill,' I say to Jones 'You are ill,' and Jones says 'I am 
ill. 1119 We are using different sentences to make the same 
statement, namely that Jones is ill. But if statements were 
identified with the words used in making them, then we would 
have three different statements, which Strawson insists is not the 
case here. So, of what then are we predicating 'true' when we say 
' ... is true'? Strawson identifies the common statement made in 
the three different examples as that of which 'true' is predicated 
by saying that "any significant predication of 'is true' is a pre-
dication of it of a statement (proposition). 1110 
I now want to present Austin's position with regard to Straw-
son's discussion. It cannot be denied that Austin was concerned 
with statements and the words used in making them, but whether he 
identified them remains to be seen. Austin felt that any discussion 
of 'statement' must include a further discussion of sentences used 
to make them, something with which Strawson would disagree. The 
making of a statement involves the uttering of words. When we are 
talking about a statement that a person has made, we are referring 
to "the words or sentence as used by a certain person on a certain 
occasion. 1111 Yet, at the same time, "statements are made, words or 
8Ibid., p. 34. g--
Ibid., p. 34. 
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sentences are used" and that further we 11talk of my statement but 
of the English sentence. 1112 This implies that Austin did dis-
tinguish between a statement and a sentence. A statement is the 
result of uttering a sentence. Specifically, it becomes later 
for Austin the case of it being that 11the statement itself is a 
'logical construction• out of the makings of statements. 1113 A 
statement is the product of using certain words on a certain 
occasion of utterance. 
As has been seen, f-.ustin distinguished between a statement 
and a sentence, but they are still closely related. In fact, 
Austin had come to say that the same rhetic acts, using the same 
pheme with a certain sense and reference (as previously defined 
in Chapter One) would consist in "the same statement •.. using the 
same words. 1114 It must be remembered that a 1pheme1 is a sentence 
and to use it with a certain sense and reference (meaning) is a 
rhet ic act. -The same pheme can be used 110n different occasions of 
utterance with a different sense or reference, and so be a 
different rheme11 just as we can use "different phemes ... with the 
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same sense and reference 11 and 11speak of rhetically equivalent acts ... 
but not of the same ... rhetic acts. 1115 Going back to Strawson's 
example of Jones being .=ill, it is one thing for two people to say 
Ibid., p. 20. 
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that 'Jones is ill, but something entirely different when someone 
says 'Jones is ill' and Jones says of himself that 'I am ill. 1 
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What is important is that the first two are the same rhetic act 
while the latter is equivalent but not the same because different 
words are used. These classifications are based on the phemes em-
ployed, or sentences as used. The two latter examples are, by 
definition, different rhemes since the words used are not the same. 
The whole situation is based on usinq words with a certain sense 
and reference, and to be truly the same rheme involves using the 
same words. 
It seems that Austin had taken the lead from Strawson and 
likewise separated a statement from the sentence used in making 
it. Yet he still was concerned with the making of a statement, 
something Strawson would deny is important in studying truth. 
I think that this was in part due to a change of attitude by 
Austin during and after the debate with Strawson. He said, "the 
traditional 'statement' is an abstractio~, an ideal, and so is 
its traditional truth or falsity. 1116 Austin was disagreeing with 
Strawson about whether or not 'elucidating types of discourse' is 
irrelevant to discussing truth or statements. It was important to 
Austin, as can be seen in How to no Thinas with Words, yet it re-
mains to be seen "whether Austin can have it botl1 ways, i.e., that 
a 'statement' is a 'logical construction' and at the same time a 
'linguistic product' of the makings of statements. 1117 Austin 
Ibid., p. 147 (I owe much of this discussion to my conversa-
-Uons with my major professor, Edward H. Pauley). 17Edward H. Pauley, The Correspondence Theory of Truth in Twen-
tieth Century Analytic Philosophy (Ph.D. Boston Univ., 1969) 
p. 238 fn. 
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wanted to give a little to Strawson, but he also wanted what he 
initially held. Strawson had been concerned with showing why a 
statement should not be identified with a sentence. Austin seems 
to accept this, yet he hangs on to the importance of words. Can 
he do this? His debate with Strawson and his ensuing discussion 
in How to Do Things with Words point the way to the further cri-
ticisms to be leveled against Austin. These will deal specifi-
cally with the latter work of Austin's as discussed in the first 
chapter, i.e., does his doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary 
acts, especially in connection with statements, settle the ques-
tion of whether he can have it both ways? Can he get away with 
holding that statements are both logical constructs and linguistic 
products? 
I now want to consider L. Jonathan Cohen's criticism of locu-
tionary and illoctuionary acts. This has to do with being able to 
distinguish both a meaning and a force in an utterance. Cohen 
contended that there are no such things as illocutionary acts. 
What we attributed to the illocutionary force can, in fact, be 
attributed to the meaning of the utterance. 
He begins by discussing the performative prefix which makes 
explicit the force of an utterance. By adding this prefix, 'I 
warn you that' to the phrase 'The bull is about to charge' I 
render it explicit that the phrase has the force of being a warning. 
Whereas, if I added 'I state that' then the phrase is not a warning, 
but intended as making some claim about the world; the bull is 
about to charqe. Cohen's claim is that the addition of the prefix 
does not say as much about how the phrase is to be taken as it 
does about the meaninq as a whole. Since the performative prefix 
involves utterino certain sounds conforming to a specific vocabu-
lary and grammar and havinq a reference and sense, i.e., the 
'I', 'you', and 'warn', then it also must be a locutionary act. 
This implies that the utterance 'I warn you that the bull is 
about to charge' is different from 'The bull is about to charge' 
because they have different meanings; they are distinct locu-
tionary acts. The prefix is a locutionary act in itself. With 
regard to our example ''if the warning is part of the meaning of 
'the explicit utterance,' · it is hardly unreasonable to suppose 
that the warning is also part of the 'other utterance's' meaning, 
though inexplicitly so. 1118 This means that what is being clari-
fied or made explicit is the meaning of an utterance with regard 
to the circumstances it is uttered in and what it is intending to 
do, and not its illocutionary force. In makina explicit the force 
of an utterance in Austin's fashion, we are, in fact, dealing with 
meaning. It is that what we rendered explicit. The prefix adds 
to the meaning because it has meaning. 
"In short, what Austin calls the illocutionary force of an 
utterance is that aspect of its meaning which is either conveyed 
by its explicitly performative prefix, if it has one, or might 
have been so conveyed by the use of such an expression. 1119 The 
entire concept of the illocutionary force, for Cohen, collapsed 
into the meaning of an utterance. If I am in doubt about some 
18L. Jonathan Cohen, "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist," "Philoso-
phical Quarterly" Vol. 14 (1964) p. 123. 
19 Ibid. , p. 125. 
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utterance then, by Cohen's analysis, I should try to understand 
more about its meaning. 
Cohen's rejection of Austin's doctrine of illocutionary 
force hinges on his interpretation of the word 'meaning.' 
Austin was interested in the 'meaning' and force of an utterance. 
Cohen maintains that the -meaning of the expression used does 
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give the force that the utterance as a whole possesses. Other 
aspects of the utterance contribute to its meaning. "The 
difference between a rising and a falling intonation has as much 
right to affect the classification of individual utterances into 
English sentences as has the difference of sound between 'raining' 
and 'hailing. 11120 'It is raining' can be meant as a warning on 
the basis of the intonation with which it is uttered. Cohen is 
claiming that the difference in intonation effects an utterance 
just as much as uttering the word 'raining' instead of 'hailing.' 
·To Cohen this has to do with the meaning of the sentence-type 
includinq more then just the meaning of the words used as part of 
the utterance of linguistic elements. 
Meaning for Austin deals with both the sense and reference 
of an utterance. "But the reference of persona 1 pronouns depends 
on their context of utterance. 1121 To say 'He lost his case' has 
a different meanino when uttered in an airport then when it is 
uttered in a court room. For Cohen, this explains why the same 
20 
21 
Cohen, "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?" p. 125. 
Ibid., p. 126. 
sentence can have different meanings. All we have to do is 
consider the context within which the sentence was uttered to 
know its meaning. This means attendino to the contextual consi-
derations that the reference part of the rhetic act is dependent 
upon. Cohen is claiming that the circumstances are a necessary 
part of the 'meaninq' of the utterance and not something distinct 
from 'meaning' called 'force.' They help determine the meaning 
of the utterance. The context of the utterance is needed in 
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order to know the reference aspect of the meaninq of the utterance. 
Meaning, therefore, for Cohen, is not just the meaning of the sen-
tence uttered because it also involves all those contextual con-
siderations which are, in fact, a necessary part of the meaning 
of the sentence. These considerations are a part of the meaning 
that the utterance has and not something distinct from meaning 
bearing another label called 'force': how an utterance is to be 
taken lies in its meaning. 
Cohen's discussion makes the claim that any assessment of an . 
utterance's meaning will have to involve more than merely looking 
at the words used. "To say that particular features of an utter-
ance's meaning are specially related to particular parts of the 
utterance is quite compatible with supposing that some external 
information is also needed in order to determine the ·actual re-
ference of the utterance." 22 There is no reason why these con-
textual considerations should be distinct from meaning. 
Jonathan L. Cohen, "The Non-Existence of Illocutionary 
Forces: A Reply to Burch," Ratio, (June 1973) p. 128. 
In criticizing Austin 1 s concept of illocutionary force, Cohen 
has argued that it is void of any si gnificance in explaining an 
utterance. All we need to do is elucidate the utterance's meaning 
40 
if it is in some way ambiguous. Because meaning is an aspect of 
the locutionary act, i.e., the 1rhetic' act, then all we are left 
with is the locutionary act. We can know that some utterance is a 
statement by looking at its locutionary meaning. Once we know 
exactly the 1 sense 1 and 'reference' behind the words or 'pheme1 we 
used in making our utterance, then we can tell whether we are stating 
something or not. This implies that ~Austin cannot get away from 
Strawson's ori ginal claim that Austin's analysis of truth and state-
ment will necessarily be concerned with words, sentences and their 
specific meaning as they are used in uttering a statement. It is all 
right there in the literal sentence meaning, whichrmeans using . 
certain words in certain contexts and situations. After all, we can 
only know what dictionary meaning is being used, if it is in doubt, 
by looking at these non-1inguistic thin gs. Contexts and circumstances 
are a very important part of dictionary meanings. 
I next want to consider Searle 1 s objection to Austin's 
distinction between 1ocutionary and illocutionary acts. Searle does 
not accept Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts either. To this end, Searle says: 
In the case of ' illocutionary acts we succeed in doing 
what we are tr ying to do by qettin g our audience to recognize 
what we are trvinq to do. But the 'effect' on the hearer is 
not a belief or response, it consists simply in the hearers' 
understanding the utterance of the speaker. It is this 
-
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effect that I have been calling the illocutionary 
effect.23 · 
The effect that the speaker is trying to bring about is a function 
of the expressions used in an utterance on a given occasion. The 
effect can be recognized because it is the type of thing commonly 
recognized as being associated with the words used in expressing 
some utterance. We •mean' what we 'say.• It is what we know about 
the meaning of words used in some utterance that enables us to grasp 
the illocutionary act that is being performed. An illocutionary act 
is understood by attending to the serious literal sentence meaning 
of the sentence used in making it. Searle, on the other hand, wants 
to "contrast 'serious' utterances with play-acting, teaching a 
language, reciting poems, practising pronunciation, etc., and .••• 
contrast literal' with metaphorical, sarcastic, etc. ,1124 
With regard to statements Searle said "that there is a close 
connection between saying and the constative class of ill~cutionary 
acts. 1125 This was even held by Austin, who distinguished between 
constatives and performatives on the basis that the latter were not 
the saying of something, of which the former are instances, but the 
doing of something. The question that needs to be answer for Searle 
is 'How can the illocutionary act of stating be discerned by examining 
the meaning of the utterance used in putting forward this type of 
speech act?' 
Searle's use of the term 'meaning' favors the assimilation of 
force into it. He wants"to make it clear that one's meaning 
ZJJohn R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1969), p. 47. --
24John R. Searle, "Austin on Locutionary & Illocutionary Acts," 
Essays on J.L. Austin, ed. Berlin and others (London: Oxford 
25 Univ. Press, 1973) p. 142, fn. I bi d . , p • 68 • 
Searle's use of the term 'meani~g• favors the assimilation 
of force into it. He wants "to make it c 1 ear that one's meaning 
something when one utters a sentence is more than just randomly 
rel~ted to what the sentence means in the languaqe one is 
speaking. 1126 There are aspects of meaning which are not concerned 
with words and phrases. One just cannot simply refer and predicate. 
An illocutionary act succeeds for Searle when the hearer understands 
the utterance of the speaker. It is these other aspects of meaning 
which determine the 'force' of an utterance. To mean something by 
what we say is to perform an illocutionary act. Searle uses Austin's 
example of 'He said "Get out"', 'He told me to get out. 1 The former 
is an example of phatic act while the other is an expression of the 
rbetic act performed. The rhetic ·act characterizes the meaning of 
utterance. The problem is that "the verb phrases in the reports of 
rhetic acts invariably contain illocutionary verbs. 1127 'He told 
me' conveys force, although very generally, but it is still force. 
Illocutionary force is built into the meaning of the sentence 
uttered. It cannot be neutral as to its force. This is because it 
is "possible to utter a sentence the literal meaning of which is 
such as to determine that its serious literal utterance in an 
appropriate context will be a performance of that act. 1128 He is 
implying that meaninq is more than just a matter of sentence meaning. 
He says that: 
26 
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Searle, Speech Acts~ p. 45. 
John R. Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," 
Essays on J.L. Austin, ed. Berlin and others (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973) p. 147. 
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If one thinks of sentential meanino as a matter of 
sense and referenee, tacitly takes -sense and reference 
as properties of words and phrases, then one is likely 
to neglect those elements of meaning which are not 
matters of words and phrases, and it is often precisely 
those elements which in virtue of their meaning are 
such crucial determinants of meaning.29 
Meaning for Searle includes those thinos that determine force. The 
force of an utterance can, therefore, be found in the meaning of 
the utterance because by definition it determines it. Meaning 
fastens on to more than words or phrases. Context is also essential 
for understanding the meaning of an utterance. 
To mean something literally by saying something will in itself 
specify wh~t illocutionary act is taking place. We know the illo-
cutionary act being performed by virtue of the knowledge we have of 
the utterance's meaning, i.e., by attendino to the context and situa-
tions which help indicate the appropriate meaning of the utterance. 
Once this is recognized we can tell what the speaker has intended to 
do in speakinq. What the speaker has to do to perform the illocu-
tionary act of stating is as follows: 
1. S has evidence .•. for the truth of p. (proposition) 
2. It is not obvious to both Sand H that H knows ... p. 
3. S. believes p. 
4. Counts as an undertakinq to the effect that p repre-
sents an actual state of affairs.30 
To know that the above claim is being made in some utterance is to 
know the meaning of the expressions used. By being able to under-
stand the literal meanino of an utterance used in making a claim 
about something, I will be able to see that the utterer has evidence 
29Ibid., p. 154. 
30rbid., p. 66. 
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which he believes about some putative state of affairs which 
he thinks I need to be informed about. On€e I recognize that 
the meaning of the utterance presupposes this, I can likewise 
recognize it as the illocutionary act of stating. That an 
utterer is making a statement becomes obvious to the audience 
because for them 'to know the meaning of the descriptive ex-
pressions is to know under what objectively ascertainable con-
ditim1s the statements which contain them are true or false. 1131 
If someone rushes up to me and says "Your house is on fire," it 
is because I recognize the meaning of the expression employed 
that I know that he is stating something about some putative state 
of affairs about which he believes I should know. 
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The criticisms I have been discussing argue that illocu-
tionary force is not different from meaning. That these criticisms 
pick up on this notion can be seen because Austin held that any 
performance of a locutionary act is to perform an il~ocutionary 
act at the same time. To know how the former is used is to know 
"what illocutionary act is so performed.1132 Also, his earlier 
debate with Strawson brought out the fact that he held that eluci-
dation of statements should involve a discussion of the words used 
in making them. But he still wanted to distinguish between sen-
tences and statements. That he held this can be seen in earlier 
debates and in his later formulation of speech acts. What the 
views just discussed show is that his particular procedure for 
3 
Ibid.,p.183 .. 
32--
Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 98. 
showing the distinction does not work, and, in ract, can be shown 
to imply the opposite. 
My aim is to show and examine the illocutionary force of 
statements, or what I dub its claim-making force. As previously 
quoted (fn 25), Searle claimed that acts of stating are readily 
identifiable with saying. I would like to end this chapter with 
a specific discussion of this claim. · Can there be clear-cut 
cases where utterances are definitely taken as being only state-
ments or necessarily having a claim-making force? The answer to 
this is given by Austin himself. Austin frequently used examples 
from the law to reveal some aspect of language with which he was 
concerned. I believe that it is here that we can find an almost 
classic example of what we have been discussing in this chapter. 
In a court of law someone is being accused of something, such 
as murder or breach of contract. Whether it can be established 
that he is guilty or not guilty of what he is accused will depend 
on the introduction of evidence. One way that evidence is intro-
duced is through the testimony of witnesses to the crime (witnesses 
do not have to be eye-witnesses, they can be character-witnesses), 
or psychological experts testifying about the defendant's mental 
ability, but they are still subject to the same conditions to be 
outlined for the eye-witnesses). What they will do is answer 
questions about what someone did or said. They will be describing 
something to the court. Everything they utter will have the force 
of a claim about what someone said or did. It is on the basis of 
the testimony that the defendant can be found gui 1 ty or innocent. 
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Everything they say in testifying is purported not only to be a 
statement, but a true statement . It has to be so to be admissi-
ble as evidence because opinions or hearsay would be thrown out 
of court. All admissible evidence insofar as it consists of 
statements is purported to consist of true statements; every-
thing one testifies to will be considered as such. That it is 
so considered can be seen in the legal concept of perjury. This 
is in the violation of the oath by which we swear to tell nothing 
but the truth. It is in itself also a punishable crime. This 
should be enough to show that everything we testify to in a court 
of law a~tomatically has the force of a statement. 
What is testified to is always identified as having a claim-
making force. The meaning of the expressions used in testifying 
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in a courtroom situation are always, without qualifition, taken as 
entailing the making of true statements. Thus, we have a situation 
where the meaning of what we say and the il locuti ona.ry act performed 
are one and the same. What we say is what is claimed to be true. 
We have here almost the perfect example of what Cohen and Searle 
have been discussing, that in_ the judicial situation, meaning and 
force are the same. 
"It is possible to perform the act without invoking an expli-
cit illocutionary force-indicating device where the context and the 
utterance make it clear that the essential condition is satisfied. 1133 
The witness in the above example does not have to prefix everything 
Searle, Speech Acts, p. 68. 
he says with 'I state ... ' The particular situation and context in 
which he is making his utterance takes care of this function. We do 
-
not have to add anything to what is said to reveal or bring out how 
the utterance is to be taken. What the witness testifies to already 
counts as a statement; it always is taken as obviously a statement 
by itself. To say rr state that I saw the defendant leave the scene 
of the murder' and 'I saw the defendant leave the scene of the 
murder' are to say the same thing in a courtroom situation. The con-
text in which the latter utterance is made shows it is meant as a 
statement. 
This example points in the direction that Cohen and Searle have 
been arguing. An individual does not have to go beyond the 
utterance 1 s meaning as said in a particular situation to make expli-
cit how an utterance is to be taken. The courtroom example implied 
this, it also implies that one can analyze and examine something 
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like a statement by looking at the meaning of the words used in cer-
tain circumstances. Although not all situations are so obvious, Cohen 
and Seale. claim any analysts of an illocutionary act will call for the 
unpacking of the utterance's meaning. Its force is simply there in 
its meaning. 
We have been examining the notion of illocutionary force as 
being found in the meaning of what we say. The courtroom example 
of 'testimony' entailing 'statements' is almost an ideal example. 
Altho_ugh Austin emphasizes studying words in examining statements, he 
still would not be amenable to reducing one to the other, as will be 
discussed later. What needs to be done next is to examine whether 
or not illocutionary acts can be analyzed in terms of 11what constitutes 
undertaking a literal utterance in terms of (some of) the rules 
concerning the elements of the uttered sentence and in terms of 
the hearer's recognition of the sentence as subject to those 
rules. 1134 Austin as well as others believed that this is not 
the case. This will be discussed next with the aim of trying 
to show whether the arguments just discussed hold, all of which 
will assist in elucidating Austin's distinction between state-
ments and their claim-making force, i.e., whether or not force 
can be found in the meaning of the expressions used. 
34 
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CHAPTER 3 
In the previous chapter, I presented some interpretations 
of illocutionary force that differ from Austin's explanation of 
it. These opposing views assert that the force of an utterance 
is exhausted by meaning, to to know the force of an utterance 
all we need to do is examine the meaning of the expressions used 
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in making it. This implies that the claim-making force of a state-
ment is disclosed by the meaning of the expressions employed in 
making the statement. What I will do is examine these interpreta-
tions to see whether they represent tenable explanations of the 
illocuti.onary force of statements. I will argue that they are not 
tenable because: (1) they would represent a mistaken view 
about the word 'statement'; and (2) their specific interpretations 
of Austin's views on illocutionary force do not hold. (1) I will 
discuss why the term 'statement' should not be conflated with terms 
like 'meaning' and 'sentence' or 'words' (2) deals with what I 
consider are the major faults in Cohen and Searle's notion of 
illocutionary force. 
What is the relation '·between 'statement' and 'sentence'? 
Is talking about one talking about the other? After all, if 
there is one thing that Austin's discussions suggest, it is that 
to say something is to do something. Is 'statement' then to be 
identified with the words used to state it? I will try to show 
that what is asserted or claimed in the act of asserting 
something, i.e., of stating something, should be distinguished 
from the words used in asserting it. 
What are the reasons for distinquishina between the 
statement I make and the sentence or words I use to state it? 
The reasons become apparent when one realizes that no specific 
sentence is necessary to the making of a statement. · Cartwright 
points 
• • • •. to the f ami 1 i ar argument which 
proceeds from the fact that uttering the words A uttered 
is not a sufficient condition for asserting that . It 
is pointed out, quite correctly, that by utterina the 
words 'Botvinnik uses it' one may, even without indulging 
in aberrant usages, assert ever so many things other thari 
what A asserted. From this it is concluded that the 
words themselves cannot be identified with any of the 
various statements made.1 
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Two individuals speaking distinct languaqes may both assert 
that it is raining outside, yet it is obvious that what they 
uttef will be quite different. Also, I may use the sentence 
'Isn't it rainina outside?" as a statement to make someone aware 
that it is raining outside, and for the purpose of getting them 
to wear a raincoat on leaving. The same sentence can also be 
uttered by me as a question put to someone who suggests we should 
go outside for a walk. All of this suggests that what is uttered 
is different from what is asserted. We can use the same sentence 
without asserting the same thing, or, indeed, without asserting 
anything at all. If this is the case, then it becowes absurd to 
hold that we assert what we utter. 
1R. Cartwright, "Propositions", Analytical Philosoohy, Ed. 
R.J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962) p. 89. 
Take the following example used by Cartwright: A utters 
the sentence (in English) 'Botvinnik uses it, 1 and a Russian 
utters a different sentence but asserts the same thinq: 
Consider A a~d the Russian. Whatever plausibility 
there is in sayinq that A asserted the words he 
uttered derives from the fact he did, after all, utter 
them. But even this plausibility, minimal as it is in 
any case, is missing when we consider the Russian; 
for, on the assumption that it is A who asserts what 
he utters, the Russian asserts A's words only if he 
asserts them without uttering them.2 
We have an absurdity if we maintain in this instance that we 
assert what we utter. If we assert what we utter and I make the 
same assertion that P.. did usino different words, then I am 
asserting certain words without saying them, which is absurd. 
One can conclude from this that a statement made by usinq a 
given utterance is not identifiable with the words used to make 
it. To make a statement one has to use words, but one should 
not be defined in terms of the other. 
I now want to carry the present discussion to the relation-
ship between what is asserted and the meaning of the words used 
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in asserting it. This has to do with a statement being identified 
with the meaning of the words used. We know, for instance, the 
dictionary meanings of the various words used in the utterance 
'It is raining'. But these same words can be used on one 
occasion to assert something rlifferent from what was asserted on 
another, or previous, occasion. 'It is raining' can be classroom 
Ibid., p. 91. 
illustration showing correct grammar to an English class or a 
description of some actual state of affairs happening in the 
world. It can be used to do two distinct things even though 
the dictionary meanings of the words remain the same. What is 
important here is that an elucidation of the meanings of the 
words will not necessarily be sufficient for determining what 
Was asserted. If it actuall y were sufficient, then the two 
utterances would automatically be used to assert the same 
thing ;in the two above cases, for the dictionary meanings are 
the same. Yet, it is quite clear that they are being used 
differently, for one of them is used to describe correct grammar, 
while the other is being used to describe some event in the 
world that is presently occurrinq. 
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If one still wants to argue for an identity between meaning 
and what is asserted, then we can further argue against it 
through the following analysis. First, it is clearly possible 
for a statement to be asserted on one occasion using words with 
certain meanings and also to be asserted using different words 
with different meanings. Followina the notion that what we 
assert is the meaning of the words used in the ·utterance, we can 
obtain the following consequence. If one asserts a statement 
which is tied to the meaning of the words which he used at that 
time: 
Thus it might be suggested that any statement, asserted 
on one occasion by utterin g words which there have a 
certain meaning, can, on another occasion, be asserted 
by uttering v✓0rds"which, on this seconci occasion, have 
a different meaning. State ments, it might be said, are 
no more tied to the meaning of sentences than they are 
to the sentences themselves. ~rom this it would follow 
that if what someone asserts, on some occasion, is the 
meaning which the words he utters have on that occasion 
of their utterance, then it is possible that he or some-
one else should, on another occasion, assert that meaning 
by uttering words which o~ that occasion of their 
utterance, don't have it. 
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This absurd consequence would have to be admitted if one believes 
that what we assert is identified with the meaning of the words used. 
Someone who holds this view would also have to concede that 
what we predicate about assertions must be predicable of the meanings 
of the words that were used as well. If this is allowed, and I believe 
it would have to be, then we again have absurd consequences. The 
meanings of sentences cannot be "affirmed, denied, contradicted, 
questioned, ... " nor can they "be accurate, exaggerated, unfounded, 
overdrawn, probable, imporbable, plausible, true or false .... 114 
These are things we say of assertions and not meanings; it would be 
nonsensical to affirm of meaning what is affirmed of assertions. To 
determine something about a sentence or its meaning is not to deter-
mine anything about what is asserted, i.e., what statement or ques-
tion was asserted by the use of the utterance. 
Strawson, similarly, pointed out some of the problems that can 
arise from relating statements too closely to the words used in 
makinq statements. This discussion is a result of his earlier debate 
with Austin on the use of the word 'truth'. For Austin, any analysis 
of the word 'statement' will involve an analysis of the words used 
Ibid., p. 97. 4--
Ibid., p. 101. 
in making the statement. The only way a statement can be made 
and known is through the uttering of certain words. Strawson 
argues against the notion that particular speech episodes are 
the proper subject of any analysis of 'truth' or 'statement.' 
"The statement that pis not an event, though it had to be made 
for the first time and made within my knowledge if I am to talk 
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of its truth or falsity. 115 He says that a statement has to be 
made, but it still is not of the event of making the statement 
that we predicate 'true' or 'false'. 'True' is used to fefer to 
the statement that is made in performing some speech-episode; it 
has nothina to do with the episode itseJf. The word 'statement' 
should also be separated from any consideration of speech-episodes 
or acts of statement-making. 
Strawson's discussion reinforces what was previously examined 
in this chapter about 'statement', 'meaning' and 'word'. These 
discussions were directed against certain usages of the terms just 
mentioned. I have already stated that Austin did not claim what 
Strawson alleges he did. This is because Pustin does not identify 
'statement' with the making of a statement but with a made state-
ment. This was clear by the time of How to Do Thinas with Words 
where he claimed, as previously quoted, that a sentence is "used 
in makinq a statement, and the statement itself is a 'loqical 
construction' out of the makinas of statements." He is clearly 
distinguiihing between 'statement' and speech-episodes. But this 
notion was suq0ested in his earlier debate with Strawson. That 
~P.F. Strawson "Truth", Truth,Ed. Georae Pitcher (Engle'tJOod 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964) p. 35. 
Austin did distinauish between them at that time can be seen 
when he says a "statement is made and its making is an historic 
e t 116 ven .... The statement made and the making of it are 
distinguished by Austin. 
Before I get to my specific criticisms of the Cohen and 
Searle discussions, I would like to examine what has been said 
about 'statement' up to this point. It should be obvious that 
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not a great deal has been added to what we know about 'statement' 
and how it should be used. In fact all that has been put forth 
about 'statement' is what we cannot say about it. The Cartwriaht 
article gave reasons for not identifying a statement with either 
'word' or 'meaninq' or'speech-episode' so that statements will not 
be misidentified. He coniluded his discussion with the remark 
that to •distinguish them from other thinqs is not by itself to 
provide either means for their detection or rules for distinouish-
ing one of them from another. 117 Cartwriqht has not given any 
means for identifying statements but he has provided examples of 
things that should not be identified with statements. 
Even Strawson has not gone any further in showing what 
'statement' means. Based on the remarks he has already made, it 
"seems that Stra1t1son is drawing a distinction between statement 
objects and statement acts, and then telling us that although 
statement objects are the bearers of truth and falsity there are 
no such things as statement objects. 118 Stra1-1son has nothing to 
6J.L. Austin, 11Truth' 1 , Truth, Ed. George Pitcher (Englewood 
7 Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964) p. 20. 
Cartwright, 11Propositions 11 , p. 103. 
8Richard T. Garner, "Utterances and Acts in the Philosophy of J. 
L. Austin", Nous, Vol. 2 (Auq. 1968) p. 215. fn. 
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add to our knowledge of the word 'statement' other than how we 
should not use ft. I will .continue in this chapter to indicate 
the contexts in which 'statement' should not be used. 
I would like to deal first with the explicitly performative 
prefixes that can be attached to an utterance. According to 
Austin, these prefixes are used to express the force of the phrase 
that follows it. Cohen objected to this notion by saying that for 
Austin themeaning of an utterance is confined to the expression 
that follows the prefix. This would give us a convenient;:method 
for distinguishing between force and meaning. But Cohen does not 
accept this notion. Thi~ is bec~use the prefixes 'I state', 'I 
protest• ·, 'I warn', or 'I promise', have meaning by themselves and 
do not lose their meaning when attached to another phrase. By 
adding a prefix we are adding another meaning to an utterance, and 
not simply making its force explicit. What was understood as the 
force of an utterance, as represented by the prefix, is just part 
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of the meaning of the whole utterance, and is not something distinct 
from that meaning. 
The problem with this criticism is that a prefix, such as 'I 
. state' or I I protest', is liable to the same difficulties over how 
it is to be taken. It is possible to know the meaning of a prefix 
like 1 I protest', but still "wonder whether 'I protest ••• ' is 
being said as a joke, as an insult, or as a protest." 9 Is the 
meaning of the prefix so determinate that no questions and doubts 
David E. Cooper, "Meaning and Ill ocuti ons", American Phil osophf-
ca l Quarterly, Vol. 9 (Jan. 1972) p. 73. 
as how it is to be taken will arise? Does 'I protest' have the 
same meaning as a prefix as it does when it stands alone? To 
say 'I protest' "shows but does not describe or state what my act 
is. 1110 But to say 'I protest that .•. ' is to make a description 
or a statement as to what I am doing in my utterance. There is, 
therefore, a distinction between using 'I protest' alone and 
using it as a prefix to another phrase. 'I protest' does not 
always have the same connotation uttered alone as it does when 
uttered with another phrase. Cohen's argument has the cogency it 
does only if 'I protest' has the stability of the meaning he im-
plies it has, but it clearly does not have this stability. If this 
is the case, there is no reason to think that all doubt will be re-
moved about the meaning of an utterance by adding an explicit per-
formative, such as, 'I protest.' 
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Cohen has also "failed to distinguish between those difficul-
ties which have their locus in the sentence uttered and those which 
have their locus in the act of uttering the sentence. 1111 This is 
the difference between what was uttered and the act of uttering it. 
The former relates to 'meaning' while the latter relates to 'force'. 
What we fail to understand about an utterance, according to Cohen, 
is due to not grasping the full meaning of the sentence uttered. 
The act-object distinction, which corresponds to the force-meaning 
distinction, needs to be examined. If this distinction holds, then 
we have another reason for dismissing the above-mentioned view of 
Cohen. 
lOMats .Furberg, Sa\inq and Meaninq, (New Jersey: Ro1,o1man and
Littlefield~ 971) p. 209. 
11Mari1yn Frye, 'Force and Meaning", The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 70 (May 24, 1973) p. 283. 
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Are there different things that an audience might understand 
or misunderstand when a speaker utters something? Is understanding 
an utterance just knowing the meaning of the words used in making 
the utterance? Specifically, does an audience understand the force 
of an utterance separately from its meaning? 
I can say to a person on his way outside that 'It is raining 
outside' so that he will put on his raincoat before leaving. It 
is obvious that the hearer understood the meaning of the words 
uttered as well as knowing that it was meant to warn him about the 
weather. That same person can be sitting in an English class a 
day later just prior to dismissal and see the same words written 
on the blackboard and not know whether it is a description or a 
warning or an illustation of correct grammar. But he still knows 
the dictionary meaning of the words. After all, they were the 
same words he heard and responded to the day before. We certainly 
would not say that his ability to use language has suddenly dimin-
ished. In both cases the hearer and reader understood the 
dictionary meaning of the sentence used, but in the latter instance 
the reader did not know what act was being performed by the writer 
of the sentence. 
Just as the type of act may not be known while the sentence's 
meaning is known, we may know the type of act perfonned without 
knowing the meaning of the sentence used. I can say to someone 
'I order you to go to the bank'. This utterance makes it obviously 
clear what act is being performed, ie., and order. Yet, the 
hearer may reply by sayinq 'Are you ordering me to go to the First 
National Bank on the corner or are you ordering me to go to the 
river bank?' He is aware of the type of act being performed by 
the sentence, but he is in doubt as to the meaning of the sen-
tence used. These examples imply that to fully understand an 
utterance, we must be able to know both what the sentence's 
meaning is and what type of act it is being used to perform. 
For someone like Austin, this 'uptake includes both grasping 
illocutionary force and knowing what the speaker said. 1112 
Cohen's criticism has been directed at Austin's distinction 
between the force of an utterance and the meaning of an utterance. 
Another problem with Cohen's analysis can be found in the way 
,meaning' can break down and the way that force may break down. 
This will involve a discussion of what Austin termed 'infelici-
ties' . 
Failure to perform what Austin called a rhetic act is due 
to the speaker failing to speak with a clear mea~ing. This is 
a result of using words without a clear 'reference' and/or a 
clear 'sense. 1 A failure to be clear over whether an utterance 
is a warning or a statement is also a breakdown. But orie should 
not conclude that this is the only way that an illocutionary 
breakdown may occur. The way that these other breakdowns may 
occur is suggested when it is realized that such acts as corrmands, 
promises, statements or requests "are the same acts whether we 
call them performatives or illocuationary acts. 1113 The situations 
12 Frye, "Force and Meaning", p. 288 fn. 
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13s. Thau, "Illocutionary Breakdowns", Mind, Vol. 80 (April 1971) 
p. 272. 
that bring breakdowns in performatives and the situations that 
bring about breakdowns jn illocutionary force are the same. 
Examples of these breakdowns are: 
A man might say, "I warn you it's going to charge", 
when it is not going to charge. A speaker might say, 
"I apologize for arriving late", when he has not 
arrived late. A man might say, "I appoint you Presi-
dent of the Motor Company", when he has no authority 
to do so.14 
Despite the fact that each of these acts breaks down, it is clear 
that each utterance's 'meaning' and 'force' is apparent. There 
are no rhetic breakdowns and it is adequate to say the first 
utterance is a warning. We have, therefore, illocutionary break-
downs which are not due to a lack of clarity. 
I have already discussed how being clear about the meaning 
of the words used in an utterance is different from being clear 
about the force of an utterance. Problems of clarity affect 
both, but clearing up one will not necessarily clear up the 
other. The problem of infelicities reveals that there is -a·.wnole 
range of questions about 'force' that have nothing to do with 
clarity of meaning. These breakdowns have nothing to do with 
meaning. One will have to look at other contexts and situations, 
in addition to those related to meaning, to consider all the 
problems and questions that are associated with the force of an 
utterance. 
A further problem with Cohen's discussion is over the use 
of the terms 'mean' or 'meaning'. They can be very ambiguous 
Ibid., p. 272. 
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-in their usage. 1 ~eaninq I can refer to the topic or subject of 
an utterance. Rut sometimes, "roughly, · , 1meanin91 refers to the 
point of, or the intention behind, an utterance. 1115 This latter 
use of •meaning' refers to the point ~of an utterance. We can 
clear up this sense of 'meaning' which an utterance may have 
without clarifying anything about the other sense of 'meaning' 
that an utterance has. In saying "he lost his case" I meant, 
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i.e., I intended to say by my utterance, that he lost his suitcase. 
Obviously 'meant' is being used here to clarify the intended meaning 
of the words used in the utterance, i.e., that he lost a suitcase 
and not a legal case. One can use 'mea~t• again to refer to the 
utterance, but do somethina quite different, viz., explain how it 
is to be taken, i.e., its intended force. In saying "He lost his 
case 11 , I can mean to warn you not to do the same. It is not 
known whether we are referring to a suitcase or a legal case, but 
it is known that we are warning someone not to repeat the same 
mistake. Likewise, even if we knew what kind of case was being 
referred to, there could still be doubt as to whether it is a 
warning, description, or a criticism. Thus, to elucidate one's 
'meaning', i.e., intention, in the one case is not automatically 
to do it in the other. 
Austin himself admitted this othe--·use of 'mean' when he 
said 11we can use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary 
force 'He meant it as an order', & c. 1116 Austin 1.,as aware 
I::> 
Cooper, 11Meaning and Illocutions 11 , p. 74. 
16 
Austin, How !Q. Do Thinqs with \fords, p. 100. 
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that 'm~aning' could be used to show how an utterance is to be taken 
as well as being aware of its use which 1'is equivalent to sense and 
reference. 1117 
The point here is that there is a certain ambiguity in the 
use of the word 'meaninq' and Austin himself was aware of it. It 
has two uses in referring to an utterance: dictionary meaning and 
force. A clarification of one use does not mean thatthe other 
will similarly be clarified. Now it is: 
surely wiser and less misleading to use 'meaning' in 
the narrower sense, and to employ other terms, say 
'illocution' to refer to other aspects of utterances, 
even though in ordinary language people do use 'mean 
to cover a wider field.18 
This is precisely what Austin did, and any attempt to reduce 
it back to 'meaning' should include distinguishin9 it from its 
other sense. If 'illocutionary force' is the sense of 'meaning' 
that refers to how an utterance should be taken, then nothing is 
lost except a convenient way for distinguishing the two senses. 
But Cohen has confused one sense with the other when he states 
that the force of an utterance can be found in the meaning of the 
words used. I have argued that this is mistaken, that we can 
talk about what we mean by an utterance without clarifying 
anythinq about the meanings of words. We do employ a use of 
1meaning1 which is intended to explain the force an utterance has. 
Ibid. , p. 100. 
,s--
Cooper, 11Meaning and Illocutions 11, p. 74. 
Cohen -is only interested in the one sense of the word 1meaninq1 
. - , 
the dictionary sense, not taken in abstraction but in the context 
of utterance. A concern with just this asoect of 1meanin91 will 
not help in d~scerning all of an utterance's characteristics, be-
cause its other aspects are quite distinct from this one. To 
talk of •meaning• as if it had only one sense is misleading. 
Clearing up the meaning of words, even by drawing on the context 
of utterance, will not simultaneously reveal an utterance's focus. 
Cohen's notion of meaning is simply too unclear to accomplish this. 
Keeping this discussion of 'meaning' in mind, I would like to 
turn to an examination of Searle 1 s analysis of illocutionary force. 
Searle also incorporates illocutionary force into the meaninq of 
an utterance. To sum it up, whenever somebody utters a sentence 
"and means something by it, he intends to perform some illocu-
tionary act II and·'furthermore, "whenever someone utters a sentence 
with the intention of performing some illocutionary act, he means 
something ... 1119 
It is obvious by now that I do not think this is the case. 
We can be aware of what an utterance means without knowing how it 
was intended to be taken by an audience. Similarly, we may be 
clear about how an utterance is to be taken by an audience with-
out knowing what it meant in the dictionary sense, i.e., without 
the context determining that sense. What we do to sharpen the 
dictionary meaning of an utterance will not necessarily sharpen 
Frye, "Force and Meanin'?11, p. 90. 
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our understanding of its force. This works the other way around 
also, because sharpening the force of an utterance will not 
necessarily clear up any ambiguities over its dictionary meaning. 
The example "The boy delivered the speech" can have difficulties 
over both its meanina and its force separately. Will answering 
questions over its 1meaning1 answer questions over its 1 force 1 , 
and will answering questions over its 1 force 1 answer questions over 
its · 1meaning1 ? \•!hen we ask "1•/hat did he mean by 1The boy deli-
vered the speech'?" we could obtain two different answers, both 
of which may have nothina to do with each other. We can say the 
following of an utterance: 
That question demands answers like "He meant that the 
messenger brought the speech to the office. 11 And on 
the other hand, this specification of what the 
speaker meant does not tell us whether the man was 
admittina somethinq or claimina somethino ... there is 
also available the "fuller" description: - "He claimed 
that the boy delivered the speech." And this one 
leaves completely open the question of what he meant.20 
Both answers describe something different about the utterance in 
question. There is no reason to believe either one is better for 
informing us about the 'meaning' of the utterance. Although either 
provides information about the utterance, it does not provide all 
the information that could be known. One answer can be better 
than the other depending on one 1 s interests. The examples just 
used reveal how one sense of the meaning of an utterance can be 
20 
Ibid., p. 291. 
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known without knowing the other sense. This shows that Searle's 
interpretation of Austin's theory: 
fails because of an equivocation on ~meaning' that we 
have already sorted o~t, namely, between 'meaning' 
signifyinq an intention of a speaker, using some 
meaningful utterance, to 11mean II something ulterior, 
and signifying the sense 2~f utterances that may or may not also be so used. 
Austin's distinction between the locutionary and illocutionary is 
an attempt to distincguish between an 'utterance' and the act per-
_formed in using it. I have been discussina how the different 
senses of 1meaninq1 are approprfate to the distinction between 
'utterance' and 'act', and what you say of one can't be said of 
the other. Thus, we can say: 
The sense of 1meaninq1 proner to speech acts is the 
sense in which "meaning" something is performing a 
distinctive act; and the sense of 'meaning' proper 
to that which may be used in given speech acts is 
the sense in which words, morphemes, and the like 
are meaningfully related to each other in the con-
text of sentences normally used to perform speech 
acts. 22 
This is how the distinction between meaning and illocutionary acts 
as maintained by Austin, and rejected by Searle, can still be 
maintained. In fact, Searle's thesis which is "a study of the 
meanings of sentences is not in principle distinct from a study 
of speech acts 1123 is mistaken. The sense of 1 meanino' which is 
21Joseph Margolis, "~-1eanin q, Speaker's Intentions, and Speech 
Acts," Review of Metaphysics. Vol. 26 (June 1973), 
p. 689. 
22 Ibid., p. 689. 
23--
Searle, Speech Acts, p. 18. 
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applicable to speech acts, and which Austin called illocutionary 
force, is not the same as the sense of 1 meaning1 concerned with 
the dictionary meanings of sentences. To say that a study of one 
is a study of the other is mistaken. We can exhaust a sentence's 
meaning by looking at the context of its utterance without 
exhausting what 'force' it is meant to have (example, p. 15). 
This discussion, up to this point, should be sufficient to 
reject the criticisms of philosophers such as Cohen and Searle, 
who would hold that' the dictionary meaning of a sentence used in 
an utterance can adequately explicate any questions that I may 
have about the force of the utterance. They have neglected the 
1 act 1 aspect of an utterance. Austin abandoned the performative-
. constative distinction (the former is the performing of an action, 
the latter is the saying of something) in favor of the notion to 
say something is always to perform some act. One of these acts 
is called illocutionary acts and are distinct from locutionary 
acts, the saying of something. This chapter has argued that this 
distinction is able to endure attempts to assimilate one with the 
other. Acts, such as betting, warning, stating and promising are 
not discerned by examining the dictionary meaning of the sentence 
used in what was said. The type of act performed does not depend 
on the dictionary meaning of the utterance used. Early in How to 
Do Things with Words, Austin held that constatives were the 
saying of something and were not in themselves an act. But even 
constatives became performative acts with both groups becoming 
distinctions within the class of illccutionary acts. The particular 
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act performed determines the 'force' that an utterance will have. 
The utterance's dictionary meaning will not fix the force it will 
have. The remaining chapters will discuss the claim-making force 
that an utterance can have when the illocutionary act of stating 
is performed. The analysis to follow will present not only what 
claim-making force should be identified with, but also what it 
should not be identified with if confusions are not to arise. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Underlying the last few chapters has been a discussion and 
examination of Austin's locutionary and illocutionary act distinc-
tion. I want now to focus on the notion of force as part of the 
total speech act independently of any concern about whether it is 
part of, or, as I believe, from, the dictionary m~aning of the 
sentence uttered. Austin's critics have not eliminated the notion 
of force so much as they have subsumed it under another notion. 
They have simply increased the burden that the term 'meaning' must 
carry. 
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Before beginning an examination of the notion of the force of 
an utterance, I would like to do some stage setting. In the process, 
I hope to reveal the general scheme into which 'claim-making' fits. 
How has the term 'force' been generally used? As previously 
seen, force has to do with how·an utterance is to be taken. Is 
what was uttered a question, colTIT!and; statement, etc.? This 
question is possible because one and the same sentence can be used 
to express a command at one moment and a statement at another. 
The sentence, i.e., the actual words, need not vary. The force of 
an utterance derives from what we do in the course of saying some-
thing, i.e., the speech act we perform. For Austin, this means 
"that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the 
words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by the 'context' 
in which they are designed to be or have actually been spoken in 
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a linguistic interchange. 111 The context, _or situation, will 
help explain what illocutionary act was performed when the 
utterance was emitted. Thus, if the same sentence is · being used 
on separate occasions to do different things, then the difference 
is attributable to something other than the sentence, viz., to the 
context. The context includes what else was said on that 
oceasion, the speaker's status, and the other circumstances in-
volved in uttering it. 
How something that was said is meant to be taken can be 
understood by attending to the circumstances surrounding the 
occasion of its utterance. It is these things that change from 
one occasion of uttering a sentence to another occasion of uttering 
the same sentence and, explain why on one occasion it is meant as 
a question and, on another, as a statement. Force is, therefore, 
connected to the occasion and context of an utterance. Knowing the 
dictionary meaning of the words used does not explain whether the 
utterance is used to ask a question or make a statement. 
The analysis of the illocutionary force of an utterance must 
go beyond the dictionary meaning of the words used because the 
characteristics of truth, falsity arid infelicities may all belong to 
a given utterance. We must consider the tot~l speech situation in 
determining how an utterance is to be taken: 
That you did warn and had the right to warn, 
did state, or did advise, you were right to 
state or warn or advise, can arise--not in 
the sense of whether it was opportune or 
Austin, How to do Thinqs with Words, p. 100. 
expedient, but whether, on the facts and your 
knowledge of the facts and purposes for which 
you were speaking, and so on, this was the 
proper thing to say.2 
For this reaso~, Austin combined constatives and performatives to-
gether as illocutionary acts. The way performatives are assessed 
and the way constatives are assessed are assimilated in assessing 
the total speech act. About the constative~performative and the 
locutionary-illocutionary distinctions we can say: 
The thought of the purely constative, as that 
which is .just and simply true or false, is 
really, he seems to suggest, the result of 
concentrating on the locutionary aspect of 
some speech acts, on their meaning (sense and 
reference), to the neglect of their i11ocu-
tionary aspects; the thought of the purely 
performative, as that which has nothing of 
truth or falsity about it, is the result of 
concentrating on the illocutionary aspect of 
some speech acts neglecting the 'dimension 
of correspondence with facts. 1 3 
This is how Austin arrived at his doctrine of performative and con-
stative utterances. This change paves the way for a discussion of 
the illocutionary force of an utterance, including the force of a 
statement. For the moment, I shall concentrate on the illocu-
tionary aspect of a statement and ignore the question of its 
truth and falsity. This is what I intend, but one may wonder how 
I can study the claim-making force of statements whose very nature 
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is to be true and false and at the same time ignore this crucial 
aspect. Before going any further, I would like to discuss this point. 
2 
Ibid. , p . 144. 3--
P.F. Strawson, "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning"', Essays on 
J.L. Austin, ed. Berlin and others, p. 53. 
My concern with claim-makinq force is not an interest in 
what statement is asserted in an utterance. Rather, I am in-
terested in what it is about an utterance that makes it a state-
ment, and gives it claim-making force. It is a matter of the 
difference between the act of stating something and the state-
ment that is made. It is not the making of a statement which is 
true or false, but what is stated that is true or false. That 
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an utterance has a claim-making force is due to certain intentions, 
contexts, situations, etc., as well as forms of words. Strawson 1 s 
statement quoted in the previous paragraph implies that it is the 
locutionar_y aspect of the utterance that will inform us as to 
what is true or false, but it is the illocutionary aspect which 
tells us whether it is the kind of thing which can be true or false. 
It is this latter aspect that I want to explore. That something is 
tr-ue or false will depend on whether or not the statement made fits 
with, or corresponds to, the state of affairs which is claimed to 
be the case. If we are to say that it is the act of stating which 
is true or false, then we are left with the absurd consequences 
Strawson pointed out in his 1950 debate with Austin as mentioned 
in Chapter Two. But we have already pointed out in that chapter 
that Austin did distinguish between the statement made and the 
act of statement-making. 
In examining the claim-making force of a statement, I want 
to deal with three examples of utterances used to make statements. 
The first example is where the statement is made explicit through 
a performative device; the second is where the utterance lacks 
this specific device but is still called a statement; and the 
third is the utterance which does not have the common character-
istics usually associated with a form of words used to make a 
statement. Illustrations of these types of utterance just des-
cribed would be: ~I state that it is raining,' 'It is raining' 
and 'Isn't it raining?' all of which could be said to express 
statements. Although I do not believe that the first and third 
illustrations are as common as the second, they are still possi-
ble, and their unusual character will aid in examining the notion 
of claim-making force. If they are possible, then it is their 
claim-making force which accounts for their all being considered 
statements. 
What are the conditions that any speech act must fulfill for 
it to constitute a certain speech act? Speech acts imply certain 
things: 
This is the use of 'imply' I shall be concerned 
with: the use in which the performance of a 
certain deed (including a speech act) gives the 
audience a right to infer something about the 
performer's beliefs. The right is given not by 
the speaker but by the action aad its occurrence 
in a certain type of situation. 
If this were not the case, we would cease to listen and respond 
to a speaker's utterance. These requir.ements are even necessary 
to insincere utterances such as lies, because if the audience did 
not believe that the liar had the beliefs and attitudes which the 
particular speech situation calls for, then his lie would not be 
Mats Furberg, Sayinq and Meaninq, p. 95. 
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convincing. Every utterance a speaker emits must fulfill these 
conditions if it is to be taken seriously. In any serious 
utterance, there will .be certain implications associated with 
that particular speech act. It is through these implications 
that we can determine whether the particular speech act performed 
is the appropriate one or not. 
An examination of these implications is an examination of 
the illocutionary dimen~ion of an utterance; This dimension, 
in the case of statement making, consists of uttering words in 
circumstances that satisfy the felicity-conditions of stating. 
What is it about an utterance that makes us take it as claiming 
something to be true or false when in other circumstances the same 
words could be used and not be taken as the making of a statement? 
To take my first illustration, the 'I state that' which pre-
cedes 'it is raining' is prefixed to reveal how the speaker wants 
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his utterance to be taken, in this case, as making a claim about the 
world: "'I state that' is often a signal that the speaker is firmly 
determined to defend a certain utterance, be it a constative, a 
value-judgement, or whatnot. 115 This comment suggests that the phrase 
'I state that' may be used to indicate something other than a claim 
about the world. But I am only interested in its use in making a 
claim. 'I state that it is raining' renders explicit how an 
audience should take my utterance. In this instance, I am telling 
you that my utterance is the type of thing which is true or false. 
It's the difference between making a claim and informing you that 
5 
Ibid., p. 228. 
what I am doing is making a claim. Uttering 'I state that' is 
doing the latter. 
Before we can assess something as true or false, we may 
sometimes have to indicate that it is the type of thing that 
can be true or false. To assess it as true or false, we see how 
it corresponds to some actual state of affairs. To assess it as 
a claim is to assess whether or not it is the appropriate thing 
74 
to be saying on this occasion and under these circumstances: 11The 
sense which does concern us is its illocutionary (or explicit per-
formative) sense. 116 It will be those things that are associated 
with performatives and their felicity conditions that will indicate 
whether or not what I am doing is the type of thing that should be 
taken as a statement. 
When I say, 'I state that it is raining,' I assume: responsi-
bility for the fulfillment of cettain conditions. For example, 
I must be in the position of possessing adequate information about 
the current weather situation. To be in this position, I must have 
just come in from outside, be looking out a window, or have been 
informed by someone who was just outside. If my audience cannot 
assume one of these conditions to be the case, then they will accuse 
me of simply hazarding a guess. These conditions must obtain for a 
claim-making utterance to be in order, just as an army officer must . 
have the status of being in authority to give orders which others 
are expected to obey. A person has to be in the right position to 
Christopher Olsen, "Austin Worries A.bout I State that ... ," 
Mind, Vol. 76 (January, 1967) 1, p. 113. 
make a statement. If he is not in the right position to make a 
statement there is no reason to think that what he utters is being 
used to make a statement. To know that an act of uttering some-
thing is making a claim will depend, in part, on whether it is 
justified by the utterers' position. If it is not so justified, 
the most one can say is that such an act is an attempt (albeit 
unsuccessful) to make a claim. 
That an utterance should be taken as having a claim-making 
force, may depend on certain things being said or done by the 
speaker as well as by his audience. Austin says that "if I have 
stated something, then that commits me to other statements: other 
statements made by me will be in order or out of order. 117 This 
not only refers to other statements that I make but to statements 
that other individuals make. If I make plans to go on a picnic 
immediately after stating that it is raining, then there is reason 
to believe that what I first said was not seriously intended as a 
statement of fact. I have by my actions seemingly contradicted my-
self. When we make a statement, we are implying that we believe 
that what is stated is actually the case. When I believe the 
statement that I make, then anything else said in connection with 
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my statement must be in line with it. When an utterance is made, 
its claim-making force will be appropriate if certain other related 
things are true. Its force will be happy only if certain conditions 
obtain. If these other conditions, e.g., felicities r.1 and r.2 
(as seen in Chapter One), do not obtain, then we may conclude that 
7Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 138. 
the 'I state that •.• ' was not the appropriate thing to say. The 
circumstances simply were not the ones that would justify the 
claim-making force made explicit in the utterance. 
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But why wouldn't we say that the utterance is false instead of 
inappropriate? This question represents the distinction between 
saying that the statement is true or false and that it is some-
thing which constitutes the making of a claim. In the latter 
"case of a putative statement presupposing ... the existence of that 
which it refers; if no such thing exists, 'the statement' is not 
about anything" ... "it is better to say that the putative statement 
is null and void .... 118 The circumstances must allow for the 
utterance to have a claim-making force; if they do not, the utter-
ance is not the appropriate one for the situation. The claim-
making force is not found because the putative statement is unhappily 
made. 
What about 'It is raining'? What gives this a claim-making 
force rather than the force of a warning? We could assess it the 
same way as the explicit version -because 11..,.,e may-make explicit what 
we were doing" for example, "to say 'I state that he did not' is to 
make the very same statement as to say 'he did not.' 11•9 We simply 
look at those circumstances in which the utterance is made to see 
whether or not it can be said to have a claim-making force. That is, 
we look at the 11ceremonial non-verbal procedures ; the circumstances 
of the utterance and the speaker's status ... 1110 The audience 
~Ibid., p. 136. 
115Tcf. , p. 134. 
10Furberg, Sayinq and r.1eaninq, p. 211. 
would have to infer from all these evidences that the utterance 
does or does not have the force of making a claim. In this in-
stance, the speaker believes that certain circumstances are the 
case, for example, that the streets are wet, I take my umbrella, 
you take your umbrella, I have cancelled my outdoor activities, 
you have cancelled your outdoor activities, etc. 
'It is raining' can also be a -warning and made explicit by 
the addition of the prefix 'I warn.' But if this act is to be 
happy, then it must be true that it is raining. This means that 
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the statement that it is raining must be true in order for the warn-
ing to be the correct thing to give under the circumstances. Also, 
if I utter 'It is raining' as a statement, it might serve to warn 
you even without my intending it to. Because I made the statement, 
you then had information, and were forewarned as to whether to take ·; 
an umbrella or not. The point here is that an utterance may have 
the force both of being a warning and a claim. The situations and 
circumstances which need to obtain if the utterance can be said to 
have a claim-making force can be found in other types of utterances, 
just as other types of force can be implied when a statement is made. 
It is for this reason that an utterance like 'Isn't it 
raining?' may well be a statement and can be taken to emphasize 
how hard it is raining and be equivalent to 'It is raining (hard), 
isn't it?" When I utter this to someone immediately after coming in 
from the outside and after cancelling my outdoor activities, the 
utterance might very well have the force of a statement although the 
words are uttered in the .-form of a question. If these things are the 
case, then the utterance may be appropriately said to have a claim-
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making force. In fact, many types of discourse have the force they 
are said to have only because a true statement is implied. 'I warn 
you that the bull is about to charge' can fail as a warning unless 
the statement 'the bull is about to charge' is true. Since a state-
ment is implied by these other types of acts, why couldn't the im-
plied statement become the object of our interest? Despite th~ in-
terrogative illocutionary force-indicating devices contained in 
"Isn't it raining?' the context in which it is uttered may suggest 
that a statement is actually being made. In this example, the con-
text of the utterance is obviously very important for it to be taken 
as a statement. · If various types of speech acts imply a statement 
or the truth of a statement, then why couldn't something that sounds 
like a question be taken as a statement, especially if the context 
in which it is uttered indicates some claim is being made? Why would 
someone ask this as a mere question if, for instance, he just came 
in 'from outside?' It seems more likely, under the circumstances, 
that he is making a statement. 
This suggests that many types of discourse and not just state-
ments, are dependent on a relationship with the facts. As previously 
quoted, in this chapter (footnote 2) Austin believed "the question 
of whether ... you were right to state or warn or advise, can arise ... 
on the facts and your knowledge of the facts.'' I think it is safe to 
agree with Strawson on the following: 
The facts of the case may be such as to 
make a request a reasonable request, an 
order a sound or justifiable order, a 
piece of advice good advice; or they 
may be such that the request is unreasonable, 
the order unsound, the advice bad. 11 
A relationship with the facts is important not only for determining 
the truth or falsity of statements but also whether or not things 
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like requests, commands, promises, warnings, statements, etc., are 
warranted or not. The facts make these illocutionary acts the . 
appropriate acts to perform. It is because of this that things like 
commands and promises have a descriptive as well as performative as-
pect. Austin had come to believe that characteristics of constatives 
also apply to performatives and that characteristically performatives 
apply to constatives. A relationshi~ to the facts, then represents 
one general dimension for assessing all types of discourse. How is 
it that the facts decide that a command or promise is appropriate? 
It is because the different types of discourse are warranted only if 
some statements are true. All types of discourse, commands, promises, 
statements, requests, etc., are appropriate only if the facts indicate 
that they were the appropriate things to say. Certain statements im-
plied by these acts must be borne out of the facts, or, at the very 
least, must be believed to be so borne out. 
1 I 
P.F. Strawson, "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'", Essays 
on J.L. Austin, ed. Berlin and others (Lon~0n: Oxford 
University Press, 1973) p. 65. 
• 
Further Remarks 
For an utterance to have or imply a claim-making force is to 
say that it was appropriate for the speaker to make some claim or 
imply a claim about the world, which may or may not fit the facts. 
The business of statements, for Austin, was to describe some actual 
state of affairs. But the making of a statement also implies a 
whole range of facts that need to obtain before we can call what we 
are uttering a statement, or an utterance can be correctly said to 
have a claim-making force. 
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I believe that if one is not clear about how Austin understood 
the word 'statement', then one could be left with a very confused 
and mistaken doctrine. I say this because it has been suggested 
that if we can determine that a statement was the appropriate utter-
ance to make then we also know that it is a true statement. 
Establishing the claim-making force of an utterance presupposes, on 
this view, the truth of the statement that is made. ·rt is no · wonder 
that it was the appropriate utterance to make! Take, for example, 
the utterance 11I warn you that the bull is about to charge. 1112 How 
do we know that this was the appropriate thing to utter? How can this 
be a happy act of warning? Austin said 11that for a certain performa-
tive utterance to be happy, certain statements would have to be 
true. 1113 For a warning to be the appropriate act for the 
circumstances in which it is uttered, it will need to be happy and 
12 
Austin, How to Do Thinqs with Words. p. 55. 
13 
Ibid., p. 45. 
to be happy or unhappy it must be "true or false that it is going 
to charge; and that comes in in appraising the warning .... 1114 It 
will be ~- happy act of warning if it is true that the bull is about 
to charge and an unhappy act of warning if it is false that the 
bull is about to charge. 
Now consider the utterance 'I state that p'. According to 
C. Olsen's interpretation of Austin we investigate "the happiness 
(or unhappiness) of (this) locution, and its happiness will depend 
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to a great extent ... on the truth of 'p. 11115 This means that any 
happy occurrence of 'I state that p' "does not seem capable of being 
true or false in any significant sense, because the 'I state that' 
guarantees the truth II of the entire utterance. 1116 'I state that p' 
does not seem capable of lending itself to the truth/falsehood 
dimension. As criticisms, Olsen's comments are important because 
Austin believed that we investigate the truth of 'I state that p' in 
the same manner that we would investigate the truth of the statement 
1p 1 • Olsen said that for 'I state that p' we "investigate ... the 
happiness (or unhappiness) of the locution'' while 'p' is"meant 
first .and foremost to be liable to assessment in what Austin (called) 
the "truth/falsehood dimension." . · 17 
In evaluating Olsen'.s comments, I can only conclude that he is 
mistaken. At the time of How to Do Thinqs with Words, truth and 
falsity had become for Austin just one way in which ''the words 
Ibid., p. 135. 
15olsen, "Austin Worries About 'I state that ... "', p. 113. 
16Ibid., 
,.,--
p. 112. 
Ibid., p. 113. 
stand in respect of satisfactoriness to the facts, events, situa-
tions, etc., to which they refer. 1118 An utterance can be· related to 
the facts by more than the truth/falsehood dimension of assessment, 
statements included. Truth and falsity are only one dimension for 
assessing a particular utterance. Truth and falsity "have no unique 
position over the matter of being related to the facts in a unique 
way ... 1119 Austin wanted to go beyond assessing an utterance on the 
basis of only being true or false to the 11general dimension of 
being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, 
in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and 
with these intentions. 1120 
Austin treated statements as he did other performatives; for 
an utterance to be a happy case of warning, it must be true that 
someone is in danger and that this is being successfully brought 
to his attention by words the potential victim will recognize. 
Similarly, for a statement to be happy, it will, among other things 
that must go right, have to fit the facts truly. This is because 
it is the right thing to utter with regard to the facts. If for 
some reason it is not and is therefore false, then according to 
the above quote it was the wrong or improper utterance to have 
made for the situation and circumstances, a determination that 
often cannot be made in advance but only after checking. 
8 
Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 148. 
19 
I b i d . , p . 148 . 
20--
I bid. , p. 144. 
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Statements, for Austin, were just one type of utterance, but 
he believed that they could be assessed in the same manner as other 
types of utterance. Austin asked, "Can we be sure that stating 
truly is a different class of assessment for arguing soundly, ad-
vising well, judging fairly, and blaming justifiably? 1121 The 
evidence by which we judge the appropriateness of a statement is 
not very different from the evidence by which we judge the appro-
priateness of a warning or a piece of advice. The facts play the 
same role in assessing acts of stating as they do in assessing acts 
of warning. The same things determine if a statement and a warning 
were successful or unsuccessful. The success or failure of ~any 
illocutionary act is dependent on the same type of assessment. 
The Olsen article uses an analysis where 'I state that p' is 
compared with 'I warn you that p'. For both utterances to be happy 
'p' must be at least true. Olsen claims that if this is the case, 
then in all instances where it is proper to say 'I state that p' 
there can be no doubt as to the truth of the statement. The pro-
blem with this is that Olsen fails to carry his comparison far 
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enough in attempting to drive a wedge between 'I state that p' and 
the statement 'p'. Remember, Austin belie vr.cf th at we should investi-
gate the happiness of 'I state that p' in the same way as we would 
for 1 p 1 • Olsen claims that the former implies the truth of 'p', 
and that the truth of 'p' is a condition for the happiness of 'I 
state that p. ' 
Olsen can .be .~een · to mi~s the point if we look at what 
I b i d • , p • 144 • 
--
Austin called a more general dimension of assessing utterances, 
i.e., when we judge whether something is the appropriate thing 
to say, and not just whether it is true or false. We should ask, 
is 1 I state that p 1 appropriate for the same situation and cir-
cumstances that pis appropriate? For example, is 1 I state that 
the bull is about to charge' as appropriate as 1The bull is about 
to charge 1 ? What Olsen fails to realize is that the former merely 
presupposes the truth of ' ... the bull is about to charge' in the 
sense that if the whole utterance was the appropriate utterance to 
make, then it is presupposed that ' ... the bull is about to charge 1 
must be true. Olsen's comparison does not go far enough because 
he does not treat 'The bull is about to charge' as an utterance 
which may or may not be happy for the circumstances in whjch it is 
uttered. If he had, he would have seen that the circumstances 
surrounding each should be investigated similarly in order to 
determine ,.their appropriateness. Olsen applied the appropriateness 
assessment only to 'I state that p'. Since Austin meant this as a 
general dimension for all utterances, Olsen is mistaken. 
If we can assess an utterance as being happy or the appro-
priate thing to have uttered, then, to use Olsen' s v;or ds, nthe 
utterance as a whole does not lend itself to true/false assess~ -
ment.1122 The reason that Olsen is mistaken is due to the fact 
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that it is because we are able to assess a statement as either true 
or false that we can judge that it was happily or unhappily uttered. 
The truth/falsehood dimension is just one way that we can assess 
a 
Olsen, "Austin v!orries About 'I state that ... "', p. 113. 
the appropriateness of an utterance. To presuppose the truth 
of 'p' is not to determine that 1p 1 is true, but only to judge 
that 'p' is true. 
One way that Austin's use of the term 'statement' could 
be said to prejudge the question of the truth of what is stated 
would be if those facts, situations and circumstances that make 
an utterance an instance of stating are confused with those 
facts, sifoations and circumstances that make it true. If this 
were the case, then Austin's notion of making a statement would 
entail an infallibility requirement. After all, Austin says 
"on the facts and your knowledae of the facts {that) this was 
the proper thing to say. 1123 Perhaps Austin may have suggested 
too close a relation to facts as a condition for knowing that 
a statement was the proper utterance to make, but I do not think 
this was his intention. 
Take the status of the speaker and his relation to the 
facts. Austin said one's utterances can have the force of 
making a claim when the speaker is in a position to know the 
facts his statement is about. He said, "You cannot state how 
many people there are in the next room; if you say 'There are 
fifty people in the next room', I can only regard you as 
guessing ... 1124 This seems to mean that since I am not in the 
next room and cannot know that there are fifty people in it, I 
could not be making a statement, only a guess or conjecture. 
C. 
Austin, How to Do Thinqs with Words, p. 144. 
24 
Ibid., p. 137. 
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But I could be taken as obviously making a statement if I were 
in the room. The situation would lend itself to making a 
statement appropriately, according · to Austin, if I am in a 
position to know the facts that the utterance is about. He seems 
to be implying that statement making involves a very close ac-
quaintance between the speaker and the facts that his statement 
are about, i.e., that the speaker's situation virtually insures 
that the statement is true. 
Consider the insincereity forms of infelicity ( . 1 and 
.2). According to these, the statement 'It is raining' implies 
certain other statements, e.g., 'The streets are wet'. If the 
former statement is to be happy, then the latter statement must 
be in accord with it. The truth of the first statement implies 
the truth of the second statement. The second has to be true in 
order for the first utterance to have a claim-making force. But 
this begs the question since the truth of the first is the po1nt 
at issue. If I settle the question of its truth in advance, then 
I am forced to admit, if someone takes me outside and shows me 
bone-dry streets, that I failed to make a statement. 
It seems to me that what I should admit to instead is that I 
had made a false statement. Surely the latter makes more sense. 
It makes more sense because the facts prove the statement was 
false and not that the facts proved that the making of a statement 
was not the proper thing to have done. The statement that was 
uttered simply turned out to be false. We can come to know that 
a statement is true or false separately from knowing those facts 
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that give the utterance a claim-making force. Thus, I may look out 
of a wet windowpane and not know that someone just hosed it down. 
'It is raining' was apparently warranted, but I turned out to be 
wrong. If .we are not careful about distinguishing between those 
facts and cjrcumstances which make a statement a .statement and those 
facts and circumstances ~hich make it true or filse then our inter-
pretation of claim-making force would be full of difficulties. 
Austin obviously believed that the truth/falsehood dimension of 
assessment was applicable to statements. He believed that questions 
of truth and falsity depended on whether the statement ''corresponds 
to the facts. 1125 I al so implied that .A.ustin seemingly required too 
close an acquaintance with the facts in order to make a statement. 
Although I do not think Austin is overly clear about this matter, 
my comments on this close acquaintance between the speaker and the 
facts are obviously an over-statement of the problem. At one point, 
Austin said that in making a statement "Facts come in as well as 
our knov,ledge or opinion about facts. 1126 This implies that what we 
believe or think as to what the facts are is important for deciding 
whether a statement was the proper thing to have said. Believing some-
thing is true will serve very well for making a statement, while the 
facts themselves will determine whether the statement made is true 
or false. A happy act of stating does not require an infallible 
knowledge of the facts. If we treat stating as dependent on what we 
believe to be true, then the usual sense of the term 'statement' is 
Ibid., p. 139. 
26--
Ibid., p. 141. 
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is retained, i.e., a claim that is warranted by the circumstances. 
What I have been attempting to do in the present discussion 
is show that if one is not clear over how Austin treated the word 
'statement, 1 certain confusions can arise. I discussed how Austin 
went beyond the truth/falsehood dimension in giving a fuller 
assessment of an utterance. One must also be clear over the 
different ways that a statement may be related to the facts by 
distinguishing such things as those facts that make it true and those 
facts that give the utterance its claim-making force. If they are 
confused with one another, then confusions will arise. With these 
things in mind, I want to discuss, in the next chapter, exactly how 
Austin would have understood the claim-making force of an utterance. 
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CHAPTER 5
Austin realized that being related to the facts is a com-
plicated affair. The facts make whatever was uttered an appro-
priate th tng· to have_satd. Being true is only one way of deter-
mining that an utterance is the right or appropriate thing to say. 
Austin said that 11we cannot quite make the simple statement that 
the truth of statements depends on facts as distinct from knowledge 
of facts. 111 Our knowledge of the facts can change and may alter 
what we previously said was the case. Much of what we say "depends 
on knowledge at the time of utterance. 112 This knowledge may very 
well be incomplete, obsolete, or misinterpreted so that any state-
ment based on this knowledge may be proven false when put to the 
test. The facts and what we know of the facts are two different 
things. 
Austin's emphasis on the importance of the speaker's knowledge 
of the facts in making truth claims leaves open the possibility of 
statements being false. The facts may seem to be such that the 
statement the speaker makes is believed to be true. But on closer 
examination it is seen to be false. Had he known more, the state-
ment would not have been made. A false statement was not the 
appropriate thing to have said, although the speaker's knowledge 
at the time suggested it was the right thing to say. From this, it 
Ibid. , p. 143. 2--
I b i d . , p . 143 . 
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follows that he does not have to state the facts truly in order to 
make a statement. Other thin gs must also be in order for something 
we say to be a statement. What a speaker knows about the facts 
give him reasons for making a state ment, while fitting the facts 
makes it true. Together, they make the statement appropriate or 
right under the circumstances. But only the speaker's knowledge is 
relevant to the question of his utterance having claim-making force. 
If a speaker's statement cannot be said to be either true or 
false, it will be because the speaker's knowledge of the situation 
and circumstances is not sufficient to decide one way or the other. 
The speaker cannot claim: 'There is no life on Mars as we know it,' 
because the circumstances are not sufficiently known to make such a 
claim. We have never been there or been in any position to gather 
any information about life on Mars, nor has the evidence gathered by 
Mars probes been conclusive. Any utterance about life on Mars will 
be more of a guess than a statement of fact. A speaker must have 
enough knowledge of the facts which he believes his statement will 
fit: "The truth or falsity of statements is affected by what they 
leave out or put in and by their being misleading, and so on. 113 
When a speaker's utterances express a statement, it is false when it 
inaccurately represents the facts and true if the statement repre-
sents them accurately. It is happy if it is the appropriate thing 
to say under the circumstances. 
As stated before, I am only interested in those utterances 
which are seriously made. Lies, jokes, play~ metaphors, etc., do 
Ibid. , p. 145 . 
not count as serious statements of fact. They are important in the 
sense that, for example, a person uttering a lie is saying something 
that is parasitic on a serious linguistic exchange. If a liar could 
not get his audience to believe that what he has uttered is serious 
then his lie would not work on the audience. A lie can only be 
successful if the audience believes the liar sincerely means what he 
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is saying. I am interested in those utterances where the speaker 
seriously believes that what he states is the case. In such instances, 
the speaker believes his advice is good, his promise will be kept, his 
statement is true, and his order is meant to be obeyed. His audience 
must believe that the speaker is sincere and intends these acts to 
be taken seriously. His advice may be bad or intended it to be 
bad, his promise not to be kept, his statement a lie, his order 
illegitimate; but the speaker must give his audience reason to 
believe that he can back them up. As attempts to deceive, lies 
must get the audience to believe everything is in order or the liar's 
deception will fail: "A serious utterance does in our world entitle 
the audience to infer that the speaker thinks that he, when asked to, 
can back it up in a way appropriate to it. 114 Our utterances 
have to be taken seriously or nobody would listen to us, as in 
the story of the little boy who creid "Wolf!" too many times. 
Because we take an utterance seriously, we infer that the speaker 
knows and believes certain facts: 11A speaker who wants to affect 
us~with what he says has therefore every reason to pose as having 
Furberg, Saying and Meaning, p. 91. 
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these beliefs. 115 
Just as a promise is still a promise when given ~n bad faith, 
a statement is still a statement even when it is false. In dis-
cussing claim-making force, the question that needs to be asked 
is: What is it that an utterance needs in order to have this claim-
making force, even--though· the statement itself may be false? Further, 
what is it about saying 'It is raining outside' that makes it a 
statement as opposed to a guess or conjecture? Although a statement 
was not the appropriate thing to have said because it turned out to 
be false, it still may have the force of making a claim. It is the 
act of stating in which I am interested at the moment, i.e., the act 
of making a claim. 
For an utterance to have claim-making force, the utterer must 
be making a truth-claim, i.e., he must be attempting to state a fact. 
The utteran~ must be asserting something about some actual or puta-
tive state of affairs. Although statements may falsely assert some-
thing about some actual state of affairs, the utterer must think his 
claim is true if his utterance is to have claim-making force. Al-
though he may not possess the correct knowledge, he must believe 
that he does. It is on this basis that he is making a truth-claim. 
Statements, or truth-claims, are attempts to state facts. The 
utterer believes them to be true. If people regularly uttered state- • 
ments that they thought were false, then they would violate the 
notion of serious lingustic exchanges. We would not be communicating 
Ibid., p. 95. 
anything to each other, and this seems to violate the crucial 
task of ·.language which is to communicate information. I think it 
is reasonable to conclude that when one utters a statement, he be-
lieves that it is true and that he believes that he has the know-
ledge and evidence to substantiate the claim he is making. 
The possibility of a statement being false must always be 
left open. Nevertheless, the utterer must at least believe he 
has a credible knowledge foundation on which to base what he pur-
ports to be a truth-claim. If we require that a speaker must 
have first-hand, infallible evidence which indicates what claim he 
should make, then his statement will always be true! priori. The 
conditions for making a statement would then be such as to pre-
suppose in advance the statement's truth. The utterer only needs 
to believe that he has the appropriate knowledge in order to make 
a truth-claim. This requires him to be prepared to back up his 
claim if challenged and to be prepared to withdraw his claim if 
it is shown to be false or inappropriate. 
If one considers a scientist working in a space program, such 
a person must at least believe that the information obtained 
from the last satellite to Mars was credible enough to make the 
claim that 'There is no life on Mars.' If he believed the claim 
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was true, then he would be prepared to show the evidence and infor- · 
mation on which he based the claim. If he could not refer us to, 
or produce, this evidence, then we would have no reason for taking 
seriously what he says. We should or woul d not accept what anyone 
claims if we thought the person did not have good reasons for 
making his claim. 
When an utterance has the force of a claim, the people 
involved must have the appropriate intentions, attitudes and be-
liefs. One must be able to infer that the speaker believes his 
truth-claim on the basis of his knowledge at the time of his 
utterance. Not only must he believe that what he is claiming 
is true, based on his knowledge, but his audience must also be-
lieve that he has credible reasons for making the claim. Other-
wise, the audience will have no reason to believe that his claim 
is a serious one. We prove that a claim ·isunhappy by showing the 
utterer that his putative knowledge, Which served as the reason 
for his claim, was insufficient for making the statement. His 
information was inadequate although he thought it was accurate. 
For the purpose of deciding whether an utterer has made a 
truth-claim, it is not necessary to decide in advance whether or 
not the utterance fits the facts. A non-serious statement does 
not qualify as a truth-claim. Since it does not make any claim 
about the facts, it is, therefore, not the kind of thing which 
may be true or false. It is not a statement at all because it is 
not making a serious claim about the world. A statement is the 
kind of thing which may be erroneous, the kind of t hing which may 
or may not turn out to be the case after the act of truth-claiming 
is performed. We never say that lies, jokes, plays, metaphors, 
etc., are erroneous, this is reserved for things which are said to 
be the case but on further examination turn out not to be the 
case: 11It should be noted that a mistake will not in general make 
an act void, though it may make it excusable. 116 We can show that 
. Austin, How to Do Thinqs with Words, p. 42. 
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an utterer's claim is false by showing that his knowledge was 
in some way in error without having to 1abel him a liar. 
The point of all this is that for someone to utter something 
with the force of making a claim we must be able to infer that he 
believes it and is entitled to believe it, on the basis of his 
knowledge at the time of his uttering it. A claim about some 
actual or putative state of affairs in the world is based on my 
knowledge of the facts. This claim must be recognized as based on 
adequate information to which the speaker has access. Everything 
must be in order for performing this particular act of stating, 
i.e., I must know certain things about certain states of affairs 
which I have been in a good position to ascertain. The circum-
stances, objects, individuals, etc., involved in my act of stating 
must be appropriate for makinq this particular statement. All of 
this ~s considered in judging whether a particular speech act has 
claim-making force. These things are still the basis of making 
such a judgement even if the utterance is proven false. Falsehood 
canoot rob a statement of its claim-making force, thereby voiding 
the act of stating. 
The conditions for making a statement appropriately are that 
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I believe that what I claim is so because my knowledge of the facts, 
circumstances, and my status justify its being made. Showing that 
it is not justified means that it is inappropriately made. Showing 
that it does not fit the faets the way I though it did means it is 
false. 
Take two individuals, one a world traveler who spends much 
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time flying from country to country and the other a hermit living 
on an island in the Atlantic Ocean who happens to be a descendent 
of a deserter from Christopher Columbus' fleet before it discovered 
the New World. The latter deserted because he believed it was true 
that the world is flat and that at any moment the fleet would sail 
over the edge of the world. So, he jumped ship before it took him 
over the edge. As there were only primitive natives on the island 
to which he swam, he was able to pass his belief, ie., that the 
world is flat, as information without anyone proving it to be false. 
His descendent is finally found by civilization and it is discovered 
that the hermit believes the world is flat. 
Both individuals are heard by an audience to say, 'The world is 
flat. 1 In the case of the world traveler, we can only assume he is 
making a joke or telling a story to an audience or children. We 
would not take him as making a truth-claim. We are aware that his 
knowledge of the facts would not justify his making this statement 
seriously. His status, knowledge, circumstances, etc., would not be 
appropriate for making this particular truth-claim, and if the 
audience is aware of this, they will infer that he is not making a 
truth-claim. A joke, yes - a statement, no. They are doubting he 
is making a truth-claim because the claim is false, but because his 
status, knowledge and other circumstances are inappropriate for him 
to make such a claim at all. 
But the hermit who says the same sentence, i.e., 'The world is 
flat', represents a different case altogether. He really believes 
that he is making a truth-claim because his knowledge, circumstances, 
status, et.c, indicate that he really does believe it. His 
audi~nce on hearing this would not say he is spouting nonsense 
or making a joke, but that he is making a statement. Everything 
about him, everything he knows at the time of his utterance is 
appropriate for his believing that 'The world is flat' is true. 
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The circumstances do make this an appropriate thing for the speaker 
to say. The circumstances, knowledge, status of the speaker are 
also appropriate for his audience to infer th at he is attempting 
to make a state ment, although they know that his statement is 
false. The truth of :tiis statement is not considered in judging 
that he was making a serious truth-claim. It will take more than 
falsity to make this the wrong thing for the hermit to have said 
under the circumstances. The appropriateness of an utterance may 
be criticized, whether the statement is true or false; "Thus, 
for example, descriptions, which are said to be true or false or, 
if you like, are 'statements,' are surely liable to these criticisms, 
since they are selective and uttered for a purpose. 117 For a statement 
tobe ~aright and proper thing to have said will depend on something 
more than whether it fits the facts truly or falsely. 
Take another example. A parrot on one occasion, and I on 
another, both utter the sounds, 'It is raining outside.' I utter 
this sentence to give a piece of information to someone. I say it 
and my audience takes it as a statement because they decide that I 
believe it is true on the basis of the knowledge and evidence I 
Ibid. , p. 144. 
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have. Let us say that my knowledge is based on the fact that when 
I cane in from outdoors, it was raining and, further, that people 
around me said the same thing for the same reasons. But the 
person I talked to goes outside and then returns · saying I and 
the others were wrong, that it is not raining _ outside, and that my 
statement is false. My knowledge of the facts at the time of my 
utterance justified the utterance. On the knowledge I had, it was 
justifiable for me to believe that I was making a truth-claim. Al-
though it turned out later to be false, it still had the force of 
a statement at the time I uttered it. The circumstances, my status, 
facts, etc., were adequate enough for me to utter this sentence 
with a claim-making force and for my audience to infer that I had 
good reasons for saying what I did, even if I turned out later to 
be wrong. 
Take the parrot who utters the same sounds, 'It is raining 
outside,' when it is, in fact, raining as the parrot utters the 
sounds. Are we to say that his utterance is the making of a truth-
claim? No. He would not be "Saying11 anything true because what 
he utters is not a sentence used in making a statement, and does not, 
therefore, have a claim-making force. The parrot does not possess 
knowledge of the facts and other evidences which he believes will 
justify his utterance as the making of a truth-claim. His audience 
will not infer he is doing this when he utters the sounds, so they 
will not consider him to be making a statement which happens to be 
true. It is not a statement because the circumstances, i.e., the 
parrot's status, how knowledge of the facts, etc., do not justify 
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judging the parrot's utterance to be the making of a statement. It 
is more than words being related to the world in a certain way that 
qualifies an utterance as an act of stating. There are other things 
necessary for the emitting of certain sounds to constitute the making 
of a claim, things which the parrot could never satisfy. 
Going back to the second and third chapters for a moment, I 
would like to say that the claim-making force is not a matter of 
the locutionary side of the utterance. I think believing that the 
force of an utterance can be-elucidated in terms of the dictionary 
meaning of the utterance is a mistaken notion and I have already 
argued against this doctrine. What I want to do now is bring it up 
again and see how my previous discussions bear on what I have been 
saying about the claim-making force of a statement. 
If someone says 'John went to the bank,' I may be in doubt as 
to what this means. '\4hat kind of bank are you talking about? 1 I 
might askethe speaker. The speaker might then inform me that it is 
the river bank to which he is referring. He did not mean the First 
National Bank. By simply elucidating what the words used mean, with 
regard to the world, the speaker has been able to clear up the 
ambiguity of part of the sentence's meaning, i.e., whether John went 
to the river bank or to ~the First National Bank. 
But suppose that I am a burglar and I want to break into 
John's house and rob him. I want to be positive that he is not at 
home so I can commit my crime. Even though the meaning of the words 
has been cleared up, could I not still wonder whether the speaker 
"meant it as a piece of information or as a guess ... 118 
Furberg, Sayinq and Meanino, p. 208. 
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It may very well be unclear as to whether or not the speaker really 
believes or would have any good reason to believe that John went to 
the river bank to fish. I could still be in doubt as to the 
utterance the speaker made. It was already determined by me that the 
speaker meant that John went to the river bank and not the First 
National Bank. What I have to determine now is whether the ·speaker 
believes he is making a truth-claim or merely guessing. If it is a 
guess, then I have no good reason to assume that it is a fact that 
John is down by the river bank; however if l thought the speaker was 
making a truth-claim, I would have a better reason to assume where 
John is. If I am to rob John, I must be assured that he is not home 
and will not be for a while. 
So, in addition to clearing up the meaning of the speaker's 
utterance, I must now clear up its force. Is he making a truth-
claim or a mere guess7 I will have to examine the speaker's status, 
the circumstances of his utterance, his evidence or lack of evidence 
to see whetherthe reasons the speaker has for making the utterance 
would justify his making a truth-claim _or a guess. Clearing up the 
meaning gave us no reason to believe one as opposed to another. By 
examining these things, I may find out that John actually told him 
where he was going and the he even saw John take a fishing pole. I 
can then infer that the speaker was making a truth-claim. The 
speaker's status, situation, knowledge, and evidence is such tn 9t 
he has a credible reason for believing that he is making a truth-
claim, i.e., that he is stating a fact. If he does not have good 
reasons for believing his cl ain is true, I can assume that he is 
only 9uessing and that John might very well be at home. 
Even if I can infer that he is making a truth-claim, John 
might still be at hime. If John changed his mind about going · 
fishing, his statement would be false. By establishing that he 
is making a truth-claim, I am assuming there is enough credible 
evidence for believing that it is a fact that John is at the 
river bank fishing. On this basis, I can assume that John is out, 
but, of course, I might be unpleasantly surprised to find him in. 
This entire discussion is independent of knowing precisely 
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what the words uttered mean. As a matter of fact, the speaker could 
make it clear that he is stating a fact without knowing which bank 
John went to. John may have said to the speaker, 1 1 am going to the 
bank,• so that when he says 'John went to the bank, 1 he has what he 
considered good evidence for believing that his utterance is a truth-
claim. Yet, I may be in doubt as to which bank he went to. As a 
burglar who wants to rob him, I hope it is true that he went to the 
river bank and not true that he went to the First National Bank from 
which he may return shortly. We ~now a statement has been made, but 
I am in doubt as to part of its meaning. The meaning of the utterance 
left me in doubt as~to what would make it true, despite the fact that 
the ~peaker 1 s status, circumstances, etc., are seemingly appropriate 
for making a statement. John's going to either bank would make his 
statement true. Knowing that he did not go to either, he went to 
the bakery or the post office instead, would make it false. 
I think by now it is clear what Austin would have said about the 
force of a statement, or what I have called a claim-making force, 
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had he done so. It is those things in a total speech situation 
that give us reasons for thinking that the utterance is an attempt 
to state a fact. These other ele ments have to warrant our assuming 
that t he ,utterance is the making of a claim. This is why the 
utterance is asses sed Jt her than by its being true or false. Truth 
and falsity have no special place in assessing whether a statement 
is being made. Because of this Austin went past truth and falsity 
to a dimension of assessment concerned with whether what was said is 
the proper thin g to have uttered. 
In discussing claim-making force, I have been looking into those 
aspects of assessing a statement that are distinct from those which 
deal with truth and falsity. These have to do with the speaker's 
status, knowledge at the time of the utterance, circumstances, etc., 
by which we could infer that he would be making a truth-claim. If a 
statement is found to be false, then we have reason to believe this 
was the wrong thing to have said. But this is not the only way that 
we can show that an utterance was not the proper thing for a speaker 
to have said. The speaker's status, and his knowledge of the facts 
might also give us reason for inferring that the speaker is or is 
not justified in making a truth-claim. We may conclude that the 
speaker does not have adequate evidence for b~lieving that 'p' is 
true so he could not justifiably have been making a truth-claim. 
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Cencluding Remarks 
Austin, in dealing with statements, has tried to elucidate 
the total speech act in the total speech-situation. In other con-
texts, the dominant theme with regard to statements has been to spe-
cify when they are true or what 'truth' is, as was done in the 
Austin-Strawson debate on truth. Some discussions have gone a little 
further, i.e., the Cartwright and Strawson articles mentioned 
earlier, and have sought to say what a statement is not. Austin's 
aim was to go beyond this and investigate those aspects of a speech 
act which make it the particular type of act that it is. What is it 
about an utterance which makes it a statement, warning, order, question, 
request, etc. What I have been attempting to do is make explicit what 
it is about an utterance that makes it the expression of a statement. 
Hopefully, what I have said would be similar to what Austin would have 
said about assessing the claim-making force of statements, had he done 
so. 
I have already argued against thinking we can reveal what makes 
an utterance a particular type of discourse by investigating the 
utterance's meaning. Austin believed that what makes an utterance a 
particular type is how it is related to the world, i.e., the total 
speech situation, etc~ This is precisely what he did in How to Do 
Thinas with Words, but he neglected to discuss what it is about a 
statement that makes it a statement. Facts, in one sense, make a 
statement true; facts, in another sense, make an utterance the 
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expression of a statement. We may appraise a statement not only 
on how it corresoonds to the facts in the first sense, but also whe-
ther or not the facts in the second sense justify a statement as the 
appropriate thing to say in a given situation. Both forms of 
assessment represent a general dimension of appraising a statement. 
But these two types of appraisal should be distinguished. I have 
already examined what happens when we fail to do this in my critique 
of the Olsen article. 
Appropriateness has to do with the making of a statement while 
both truth and appropriateness have to do with the statement made. 
The result is a broader view of the assessment of statements. We 
can say more about 'The cat is on the mat' than that it is being 
used to say something is true or false. We must also be able to 
determine that there are certain reasons, evidence, circumstances, 
etc., which obtain to justify the utterance as a truth-claim. If 
we cannot do this, then we have no reason to think that the speaker 
is justified in making a truth-claim. For instance, if I know that 
the speaker just came from outside, and that he owns a cat, then I 
have good reason to assume that he is making a truth-claim. Con-
trariwise, if I know that the speaker has been.out all day, then I 
can assume he is speculating or guessing. In the latter case, he 
does not seem to be in a position where he could have sufficient 
credible evidence for believing that 'The cat is on the mat' is true. 
In Austin's discussion of the illocutionary force of statements, 
he has presented more elements than we usually consider in assessing 
statements. Although it goes beyond the scope of this paper, and 
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despite the fact that I am somewhat inclined to discuss it, there 
are other things about statements that I find interesting in Austin's 
discussion. For instance, there is his point that the success of 
any illocutionary act, and not just statements, will involve the 
truth or falsity of some statement. This suggests that statements 
have a special place in performing various types of speech acts. 
Statements seem to represent a basic building block, or must be 
presupposed, in performing other types of speech acts. It seems to 
represent that aspect of an utterance that we want to be assumed, 
if not believed. In this case, it would be interesting to take this 
constative aspect of various illocutionary acts and examine it to 
see how claim-making is at least an implicit part of all speech acts. 
P.F. Strawson implies this when he says that in a performative "a 
proposition is expressed, though not 'constated' (issued as a con-
stative).119 I think the notion of a 'proposition' as an ideal enti-
ty would be unacceptable to Austin, but the quote nonetheless gets 
the point across that a claim can be expressed in an utterance which 
has a force other than that of claim-making. It would be interesting, 
then, to distinguish the different forces found in various utterances 
and see how they are related. 
Another point of interest that I would like to discuss at length 
is also suggested by Austin. The point behind How to Do Things with 
Words was to show that to say something is also to do something. 
Austin showed that by saying something we could perform acts of 
9 
Strawson, Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning' p. 63. 
warning, promisinq, stating, requesting, etc., but it is also in-
teresting to note that by performing these acts we may perform 
other acts that could not be made explicit but which nonetheless 
are being performed. By performing an act of stating, warning, 
etc., I may also be insulting, sarcastic, rude, condescending, etc. 
We may also use these words to describe someone's utterance but we 
could not say 'I insult you, 1 or 'I condescend to you. 1 This would 
be nonsense. Yet, we still perform these perlocutionary acts, so 
· it would seem they are dependent on these other acts. Those cir-
cumstances that make an utterance a certain type of act might also 
have a direct bearing on these other acts. When I say to a child, 
'Be careful crossing the street• as a warning, this seems to be an 
appropriate thing to say. But if I say the same thing to a grown 
man, so as to be sarcastic or insulting, it almost seems that it 
is precisely because this act of warning was not the appropriate 
thing to say that it makes the insult successful. An intended 
failure of an illocutionary act might very well bring about the 
success of another type of speech act. 
The importance of Austin's work is that it points out the 
complexity of ordinary languqge. One should not underestimate its 
richness, especially in making judgements about speech acts. If 
there is one thing Austin does, it is to reveal the many problems 
that arise if we underestimate language. Language and speech are 
complicated structures the study of which, if done with the care 
Austin exercises, can aid in the solving of problems and the 
avoiding of philosophical mistakes. 
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